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Miscellaneous

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Thinking the unthinkable.

The New Brinksmanship

by Tad Szulc

For the first time since the 1950s, the possibility of nuclear war with the Soviet Union appears to be seriously accepted by key figures inside and outside the US government. What long have been unthinkable thoughts now are entertained by influential men and women in Washington. Meanwhile the Carter administration is moving apace with measures designed to prepare the US—and US public opinion—for the contingency of major wars. It is a new phenomenon, based on the hardening conclusion that the Soviet Union's overwhelming concern, aside from a determination to achieve strategic superiority over the US, centers on assuring itself of military endurance and survival as a functioning society after a protracted nuclear exchange. A senior White House foreign policy specialist says: "In 30 years, I never thought war was really possible: now I think it is possible—if not necessarily probable."


What does it all mean and where does it lead? Is it a question of correct or incorrect perceptions held by officials in Washington and Moscow? What are the implicit dangers of such attitudes? There are no precise answers to these questions. But certain realities are observable. In the US, the military response to the perceived Soviet threat includes the go-ahead for the MX mobile missile system, the work on the "invisible" Stealth bomber, a controversial shift in nuclear targeting strategy against the Soviet Union, recent decisions to accelerate the production of weapons-grade plutonium, and the restoration of US chemical warfare capability. These preparations are developing

in a new psychological climate that has evolved steadily since early 1980 and goes well beyond the forums of the presidential campaign.

The new climate, dampening the euphoria of the Soviet-American détente of the last decade, can be traced to the mounting evidence of the build-up of Soviet nuclear and conventional forces, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan last December, and, most recently, the dangers surrounding the current Persian Gulf hostilities. Thoughtful analysts at the Pentagon and the National Security Council staff emphasize Soviet advances in the accuracy of their huge SS-18 missiles (plus the fact that their throw-weight greatly exceeds that of US intercontinental missiles); the deployment of medium-range SS-20 missiles in Europe, and the direct involvement of combat forces beyond Soviet borders, from Angola and Ethiopia to Afghanistan. "The grand development in recent years by the Soviets is the projection of their power into the world," says a senior Pentagon expert. And frequent and unexplained movements of Soviet troops, have worried the administration and have led to secret alerts by US armed forces this year.

The result of all this is that the hawks and doves in and out of the government nowadays speak in strikingly similar language about the inexorable deterioration in Soviet-American relations and its long-range consequences—although their points of emphasis vary. Of course nobody in Washington desires or actually predicts a nuclear war. But the Carter administration—and the Reagan team—are proceeding along a

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drawing by Vint Lawrence

double track. There is a desire on both sides to obtain some kind of SALT agreement to limit nuclear arsenals (if it is acceptable to the Senate in its present form or if Moscow is prepared to negotiate a Reagan-inspired text). Yet at the same time there is a clear disposition to strengthen US defenses through all available means.

President Carter set forth his philosophy of nuclear war at a news conference on September 18, explaining the reasons for setting in motion the development of the MX missile and for the new concept of strategic targeting of the Soviet Union. "It's crucial for our nation, for our allies, and for our potential adversaries to know that if necessary atomic weapons would be used to defend our nation," said Carter. "And that knowledge is the deterrent that would prevent a potential adversary from attacking our country, and therefore destroying a hundred million or more American lives. . . . There is a likelihood—I can't say how strong it might be; it's not an inevitability but it's certainly a likelihood—that if an atomic exchange of any kind should ever erupt, that it might lead to a more massive exchange of intercontinental and highly destructive weapons that would result in tens of millions of lost lives on both sides. . . . If necessary to defend the freedom and security of Western Europe and this country, then I would use atomic weapons." And in a campaign speech on October 16, the president returned to the subject of nuclear war. If "potential

adversaries . . . attacked the United States of America," he said, "they will be committing suicide."

Underlying this statement are Carter administration assurances (questioned by his critics) that an essential strategic equivalence currently exists between the United States and the Soviet Union. The administration's view is that superiority by either side (Reagan argues for US superiority) is destabilizing, and all its new strategic measures are intended to maintain this balance. While the Soviet Union leads in the number of strategic missile launchers, the United States is ahead in warheads. The present count (verified under SALT I procedures) is 1,398 land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and 950 submarine-launched ballistic missiles for the Soviet Union, and 1,054 ICBM launchers and 656 SLBM launchers for the United States. But the United States has 10,000 nuclear warheads and the Soviet Union only 6,000. America also can deploy the air-launched cruise missile, permitting great accuracy in targeting.

These weapons ceilings would be maintained proportionately under SALT II, if ratified, and Carter's point is that if the treaty were allowed to die, the Soviets no longer would be under numerical constraints. There are, of course, differing schools of thought as to the validity of SALT-imposed quantitative limits, and the argument (even within the administration) is that what really matters is the qualitative technological state of the nuclear arsenals.

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This has led to a concern that the Soviets have caught up or are about to catch up with the United States in nuclear technology. The central element is missile accuracy. The US, using such super-sophisticated course-correcting systems on its MIRVed missiles as "Stellar Update" (a major guidance achievement), can hit a target with extraordinary accuracy—within 500 yards or less—under what is known as the Circular Error of Probability. But the US Intelligence community believes that the Russians are coming close to this capability.

If they do, American specialists fear that the Soviet Union could be tempted to take out US land-based ICBM launchers in a highly precise counterforce strike (an attack on weapons systems as opposed to civilian targets), upsetting the strategic balance. This is why more and more US experts no longer discount the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack, judging that the Soviet Union is willing to risk an atomic exchange and believes it can survive a submarine-launched US second strike. The vast Soviet effort in civil defense, barely matched by the US, is seen as confirmation of such strategic thinking.

AERICAN RESPONSES to this new strategic "ballgame," as Pentagon and White House officials describe it, are both long term and immediate. All, however, are the product of evolution in US strategic philosophy, stemming from the recognition that Moscow now possesses capabilities endangering the US. The administration seems to have decided that the time has come to reveal in an orchestrated variety of ways, including "leaks" to the press, the countermeasures it is applying as signals to both the Soviet Union and a disturbed domestic public opinion.

The decision to proceed with the mobile MX system, expected to cost upward of \$50 billion and still greatly controversial among specialists and politicians, relates directly to Soviet breakthroughs in missile accuracy. The idea is that US Minuteman ICBMs would be less vulnerable to a Soviet counterforce strike if they could be moved continuously from silo to silo over a huge area in Utah and Nevada, keeping the Soviet targeters guessing at their location. The MX, however, poses two problems. One is that it may push the Soviets to create their own mobile missile system, which the US strenuously opposed during SALT I negotiations. The other is that the MX and the full force of Trident submarines are unlikely to be operational before the end of the 1980s. The best US intelligence estimates are that the critical nuclear confrontation period may come as early as 1985.

This notion has led Carter to sign, probably last July, Presidential Directive 59, which adds a large number of Soviet military targets—ICBM silos, bomber bases, and submarine bases—and military and political command and control centers to the present list of Soviet objectives on the American strategic list. PD-59, which comes under the rubric of immediate measures, has

created a major controversy among US experts as to its meaning and effectiveness, and it has resulted in bitter Soviet protests.

Much of the confusion over PD-59 results from the fact that its full text never has been made public (it remains a closely guarded secret in the White House and the upper reaches of the Pentagon). What is known of the PD-59 document is confined to incomplete material leaked to newspapers in the same fashion as the Defense Department revealed the development of the Stealth bomber.

The administration confirms that, broadly speaking, PD-59 is the US response to the menace of a Soviet counterforce strike at American Minuteman and Titan silos. It asserts that PD-59 is intended as the latest deterrent in the nuclear game with the Soviet Union (this was the sense of Carter's answer at the September news conference) and that it represents the culmination of studies conducted by it since 1977. These studies were a follow-up on counterforce concerns expressed by former defense secretary James R. Schlesinger as far back as 1974 as well as on the so-called "Team B" exercise conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1975 to assess Soviet strategic advances. "Team B," made up of outside experts with full access to classified information, convinced the Ford administration that the Russians were much further ahead in strategic technology than the CIA's own "Team A" had concluded on the basis of the same materials. Some experts believe that PD-59 is an outgrowth of the "Team B" work; others insist that Team B was wholly wrong in its conclusions and that therefore the PD-59 concept is equally flawed.

BEYOND THESE points, interpretations of PD-59 vary widely among US specialists. Many insist that PD-59 has simply codified what already had been an evolving US targeting policy. Targeting is constantly updated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Strategic Air Command under the Single Integrated Operations Plan. Prior to PD-59, the current SIOF included between 140 and 200 major Soviet targets, among them cities and military and economic objectives. PD-59, it is understood, has added at least 10 crucial targets, chiefly Soviet military and civilian command and control centers.

The majority view, however, is that PD-59 constitutes a significant strategic milestone. It formally does away with the old Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine, under which US and Soviet cities were held hostages in a massive nuclear exchange, by introducing the concept of Limited Nuclear Options that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown says the president must have available in an emergency. But contrary to statements by both Carter and Brown, PD-59 does not suggest the likelihood of a limited nuclear war because in the views of both the US and the Soviet Union no such conflict can be confined to a single counterforce exchange.

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A protracted nuclear war thus appears to be the equation faced by the two superpowers as PD-59 emerges in response to similar Soviet thinking. In the opinion of many US experts, this new equation may result in an increase in nuclear forces on both sides, each seeking to use its deterrent to discourage a first strike by the other side. But it has been argued that this doctrine, as applied by the US and the Soviets, could get out of hand at any given moment, especially if one perceives that nuclear superiority is shifting to the other.

MOSCOW'S SHRILL denunciations of PD-59 have suggested to observers that it is seen by the Kremlin as the confirmation of its worst fears, that the US may be contemplating a first strike to destroy its ICBMs, and, above all, its political and military leadership on all levels. How Moscow will react to PD-59 is the next step in the nuclear chess game.

The administration insists that it is not deliberately creating a warmongering atmosphere, preferring instead to characterize its actions as simply responsive to new Soviet nuclear realities. Nevertheless there clearly is an effort by the administration, quietly applauded by influential personalities outside, to show its careful consideration of the possibility of a protracted nuclear war.

Thus, as early as November 15, 1979, Carter issued the PD-53 on "National Security Telecommunications Policy," proclaiming that "it is essential to the security of the US to have telecommunications facilities adequate to satisfy the needs of the nation during and after any national emergency" and to "provide continuity of essential functions of government, and to reconstitute the political, economic, and social structure of the nation." PD-53's principal goal was described as providing for the "connectivity between the National Command Authority and strategic and other appropriate forces to support flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack."

PD-53, suggesting that the US accepts the likelihood of a protracted war, was followed last July by PD-58, which set forth plans for protecting American leaders in a nuclear war. In the absence of a Soviet-type civil defense network in the US, PD-58 called for a rapid evacuation from Washington of the president and other top military and civilian leaders to underground command posts and aboard AWAC aircraft. PD-59 was issued to complete the set of new detailed instructions to deal with a protracted nuclear war in which Soviet strategic forces and leadership might become chief targets. A separate section of PD-59, not leaked to the press, discusses the ways in which US commanders in Europe might activate tactical nuclear weapons if "connectivity" with the president is lost in an initial nuclear exchange.

The issuance of PD-59 was followed in September by a decision within the administration to accelerate

the production of weapons-grade plutonium in the US for the first time in 20 years to meet new strategic requirements. The Congress already has authorized funds for it. Taken together, all these decisions strongly indicate that the Carter administration no longer rules out a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Another straw in the wind is the study within the administration of a new antiballistic missile system, intended principally to protect the MX deployments. This would lead to the abandonment of the 10-year ABM treaty signed with the Soviets under SALT I in 1972. But the Soviets are also known to be testing what may develop into their new ABM system.

If counterforce attacks are to be key elements in the new strategic equation, it is illusory to believe that it would limit greatly the number of civilian deaths. Because most Soviet ICBM sites and air and naval bases are near populated centers, a US counterforce attack could result in between 3.7 and 27.7 million fatalities on the first day, according to a 1979 study by the Congress's Office of Technology Assessment. This range is related to the degree to which Soviet populations may have time to seek shelter, and to manner of weapon utilization (ground or air bursts). In a Soviet attack on US strategic forces, the OTA has projected fatalities between two and 22 million Americans, depending on roughly similar factors.

OTHER EXPERTS believe that a US attack on Soviet strategic targets would result in a counterstrike against American cities. This is one factor that has led to criticism of the PD-59 doctrine. Another criticism, expressed by Air Force commanders, is that the US currently lacks the capability for an effective counterforce strategy.

Finally, the Carter administration is preparing for other forms of unconventional warfare. In September, Congress approved over three million dollars in funds requested by the administration to erect a plant for the production of nerve gas. A decade ago, the US along with the Soviet Union renounced first use of chemical or bacteriological weapons, but Pentagon experts now believe that Moscow has been actively working on both, and that America is lagging behind dangerously. In the end, the US may devote four billion dollars to the resurgence of the chemical warfare program.

The question is whether the chances of a nuclear war are enhanced by the technological race on both sides and all the related preparations, and how, ultimately, their plans may be affected by mutual perceptions. Again, nobody in Washington has a clear answer. But a senior administration official summed up the current situation when he remarked in private that "we wouldn't be taking these steps if we did not feel the US was endangered." And the mood in the capital seems to reflect this sentiment, despite warnings from many quarters about the perils of the US becoming engulfed in a war atmosphere, with all its attendant risks.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A21THE BALTIMORE SUN
6 November 1980

Multinationals seen opting for own foreign intelligence

By Brian Sullam

Multinational corporations are going to begin gathering their own intelligence abroad because "it is too important a function to be left to government," according to William E. Colby, the former director of central intelligence.

But the challenge during the next two decades facing both government agencies and private corporations is not collecting facts but "determining what do they mean," Mr. Colby noted.

Speaking to the Baltimore chapter of the North American Society for Corporate Planning, the director of central intelligence from 1973 to 1976 explained that corporate planning is not much different from the intelligence activities performed by government agencies.

American corporations, he noted, could become future targets in Third World countries because these countries, whether by political design or mob turmoil, might find it to their political advantage to think in terms of disrupting the activities of multinational corporations rather than cooperating with them.

They are likely to focus on U.S. companies because "we are the easiest and civillest target."

Despite these seemingly pessimistic assessments, Mr. Colby said he is optimistic about future relations with nations of the Third World.

He noted that unity among the less developed countries against the industrial

countries of the world is breaking down because they see the examples of Japan, Taiwan and Korea, who have all cooperated with the West and experienced economic growth and an improvement in their societies.

Mr. Colby said he foresees the situation arising where "cooperation is developed to the mutual benefit and profit" of the developed and less developed countries.

Intelligence does not provide corporations or government with a crystal ball that allows them to see the future but rather provides a warning and allows policy-makers the opportunity to "bring about a better rather than a worse result."

The other function of intelligence is not to provide answers but to stimulate questions "that cause you to think and act."

As an illustration, he said, the intelligence community knew the basic facts about Iran, but they were not presented in a way to give them the proper relevance to the policy-makers.

Although the intelligence community might have said the shah had only a 5 percent chance of being overthrown before the revolution in 1979, it did not convey the devastating impact of such an overthrow.

Had policy-makers been more aware of these drastic consequences, they might have made more of an effort to preventing that action from taking place, Mr. Colby said.

Mr. Colby also noted that corporations gathering information for their own use is

part of the evolution in American intelligence that has occurred since Pearl Harbor.

It has become more systematic. Facts are assembled under one roof, thought about and examined for meaning. Mr. Colby noted that bits of information indicating that the Japanese were thinking of attacking Pearl Harbor were known to separate branches of government but they were never put together.

Another development was technology, like the U-2 spy plane, that allowed governments to extend their knowledge into areas that other governments were trying to keep secret.

He also noted that the phrase "need to know" has taken on new meaning.

Rather than just meaning limited distribution of information, it has also become to mean that those who have the responsibility of making decisions "need to know all the relevant information."

This is applicable to business as well as government managers, he noted.

Mr. Colby noted that intelligence gathering is a normal function of human life but is not always infallible. He pointed out that Moses was the first spy master, sending out warriors to give the wandering Israelites a picture of what lay ahead in Canaan.

"They reported back it was a land flowing with milk and honey, which was then subject to some criticism later," Mr. Colby wryly remarked.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE E-16

THE WASHINGTON POST
5 November 1980

JACK ANDERSON

'Bonus Babies': Some Uncivil Servants

When President Carter's civil service reform legislation was enacted two years ago, the White House ballyhooed it as the greatest boon to governmental efficiency since the invention of the paper clip.

Competent public servants were to be rewarded, not just with a hearty handshake and a scroll, but also with cash in the form of bonuses. Whistle-blowers would be given incentives, protection and recognition for exposing waste and mismanagement.

Unfortunately, this Mary Poppins scenario wasn't the way things worked out. In practice, the cash bonuses were handed out to entrenched senior bureaucrats with political clout — some of whom were actually involved in retaliation against lower-echelon whistle-blowers. Virtue is still pretty much its own reward for the working stiffs in federal government.

The handling of the bonus idea has turned so sour, in fact, that disillusioned employees refer to the program as "cash for cronies."

My reporters Indy Badhwar and Gloria Danziger have reviewed a long list of the recipients of cash bonuses — \$3 million worth, ranging from \$3,000 to \$20,000. Here's the sorry rundown on just a few of these bureaucratic bonus babies.

• Marion Finkel, assistant director for new drug evaluation, Food and Drug Administration, \$10,000 bonus. For years, she has been accused of harassing FDA scientists who were deemed "adversarial" to the interests

of drug companies. A special panel of federal investigators concluded in 1977 that Finkel and FDA management had concealed the truth and given incomplete and misleading testimony in a case involving the railroading of an FDA whistleblower. The report found Finkel's conduct "unacceptable" and recommended a reprimand.

• Jack Stempler, general counsel of the Air Force, \$20,000. Appointed by President Nixon, Stempler directed the Air Force response to charges by cost analyst A. Ernest Fitzgerald exposing a \$2 billion cost overrun in the C5 transport plane program. Fitzgerald was smeared, fired and — when he won reinstatement after a long court fight — shunted into a do-nothing job.

The Senate Judiciary Committee is investigating Stempler's role in the Fitzgerald harassment. What is ironic is that Carter, campaigning in 1976, repeatedly mentioned Fitzgerald as the kind of public servant who would be rewarded in a Carter administration. Instead, the \$20,000 reward went to one of Fitzgerald's persecutors.

• Claude J. Farinha, another high Air Force official, \$20,000. Farinha was the brains behind Project Max, a multimillion-dollar computerized management system that congressional watchdogs concluded was as worthless as it was expensive. The Air Force, with Farinha's knowledge, continued to lavish money on the program until it was quietly scuttled.

• Erich von Marbod, deputy chief of the Defense Department's security

assistance agency, \$10,000. Von Marbod came under congressional fire in 1977 for providing detective intelligence information at a time the Carter administration was selling sophisticated radar-equipped planes to the shah of Iran. Von Marbod gave incorrect assurances that the shah's security forces could keep the secret equipment from falling into Soviet hands — assurances which were completely, and correctly, contradicted by the CIA.

• Walter Kallaur, chief of the General Services Administration's Washington, D.C., regional office, \$3,500. Kallaur was the subject of a Justice Department investigation in 1978 for his activities when he was on loan to the Carter-Mondale transition team. He and an associate cooked up a way to get around GSA regulations as a means of paying transition team members until they were officially on the government payroll. Kallaur admits to using a "short cut" but denies there was a Justice Department investigation. He says Justice "looked at" the system he had devised to pay salary advances, and concluded there was nothing wrong.

• Edward Scott, former assistant secretary, Department of Transportation, \$20,000. Scott's brainchild was a costly scheme to replace secretaries (the clerical kind) with TV-sized computer terminals that would receive, store and dispense messages while busy executives were out to lunch or otherwise absent. Scott took the bonus and then left government service.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B-2THE WASHINGTON POST
5 November 1980

The Federal Diary

By Mike Causey

Don't Look Here For Election News

Looking for an oasis in today's newspaper? Craving something to read that has nothing to do with the election? Want something beyond returns, winners and losers, the thrill of victory, the agony of defeat, no reaction or commentary on the big news of Nov. 4? You came to the right spot.

Today is quiz day. First question: Name our town's single biggest government operation. Would you pick:

A) the Central Intelligence Agency, B) Congress, C) the Department of Health and Human Services, D) the District of Columbia government, or E) the Navy Department.

The answer is, nearly all of the above. In best bureaucratic tradition, the answer depends on several things.

If you are talking about sheer numbers, the District government, with more than 40,000 employees, is the winner, hands down. If you are talking about a "branch" of government, the legislative branch, which includes Congress, is number one with 37,000 people. The Senate and House have 7,300 and 19,200 employees, respectively. Other legislative branch agencies, the Library of Congress, General Accounting Office, Government Printing Office and so forth make up the remainder.

For a single unit, the biggest is the Department of Health and Human Services. HHS, formerly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has more than 35,000 employees. Back when it was HEW — and included the offices that are now the Department of Education — the department had 4,600 more people here.

Navy, for a long time, was the largest federal operation in Washington. But it has slipped in recent years as Congress and HEW (now HHS) hired more people. Navy now has only 34,000 civilian workers locally. The Army, which tries to keep up, has just over 24,000 and the poor old Air Force only about 6,500 civilians here.

The CIA does not freely give out personnel data (nor does the super-secret National Security Agency). But both are estimated, locally, to be in the range of the Justice Department, which has about 16,400 people here. Although metropolitan Washington is short on farms, and farmers, the Department of Agriculture is one of the biggies here with just over 13,000 people. Still it is a piker when compared to Commerce with 23,000 and Treasury, with 18,000. The Department of Energy seems much bigger than its local payroll, which has 8,000 workers — not including outside consultants, of course. Transportation has 10,000 people, and Interior, which we don't hear much about, more than 11,000.

There is some dispute over which federal agency here is smallest, because some are so small that if two people retire, or three are hired, their relative positions change. Among the little guys are the Commission on Fine Arts, which had six staffers at last count, and the Coastal Plains Regional Commission, which recently had eight employees. The Advisory Commission on Federal Pay last spring had only two employees, but it has recently done some hiring, putting it up with the Coastal Plains Regional Commission. The Alaska Natural Gas Transmission System has about 50 people here and about 17 elsewhere, one presumes in Alaska.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A14NEW YORK TIMES
1 November 1980

Researchers to Permit Pre-publication Review by U.S.

By RICHARD SEVERO

A group of mathematicians and computer scientists has tentatively decided to try to dispel a concern of the National Security Agency by voluntarily submitting research papers to the agency for review before they are published in the scientific literature.

The National Security Agency, which has the responsibility for collecting intelligence information, is concerned because, it says, cryptographic research in universities has become so advanced in recent years that it is viewed as a security hazard. Until a few years ago the Government had a virtual monopoly on such research.

Cryptography, the art of writing or deciphering messages in code, has increasingly become a focus of academic interest, in great measure because of the need to protect industrial secrets. There is said to be apprehension within the National Security Agency over whether an academic researcher might write a paper on methods of analytically attacking and breaking a code system similar to one used by the Government.

The decision to attempt to cooperate with the agency without violating the tradition of academic freedom was made at a recent meeting of the Public Cryptography Study Group. Details of the precise form the cooperation will take, beyond allowing agency review, have not been formulated.

Concern About Possible Controls

The group was set up last year by the American Council on Education, which is made up of university administrators. The study group itself is nine members representing professional societies in computer sciences and mathematics. It does not represent all cryptographers, and some remain acutely concerned that the cooperation may become the first phase of Federal control over cryptography in American universities.

Daniel Schwartz, general counsel of the agency, said yesterday that nothing of the sort was contemplated. Asked what the Government would do if the voluntary program did not work, Mr. Schwartz said the agency "would consider as one option seeking legislation if the problem became serious enough and there was no other way to resolve it."

But he emphasized the agency considered such an action a last resort and added: "We have no interest in going through an enormous fight in the Congress on this particular issue." He said the agency would probably not object to most papers, and if it did, the problem might be resolved by the deletion of an explanatory footnote.

Conflict Concerning Financing

Dr. Ronald Rivest, a computer scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said he thought the study group's recommendations might be workable. "But I think it is important not to forget that the need for any sort of recommendations has not been made to anybody's satisfaction outside of the National Security Agency," Dr. Rivest added.

He was asked how he would feel about the financing of his work by the agency. Agency financing of academic research has been a disputed issue in recent years.

"I feel it is institutionally inappropriate," he said. "There would be a conflict of principles within the National Security Agency. On the one hand it would be concerned with maintaining national security, and on the other hand it would be concerned with maintaining the principle of open and academic research."

Dr. Martin Hellman, professor of electrical engineering at Stanford University said he was also ready to try to cooperate.

"If it doesn't work," he said, "we can back off." Dr. Hellman said he thought the agency had become easier to work with in recent years.

The relationship between academic cryptographers and the agency became a matter of some controversy last August when Leonard Adleman, a computer scientist at M.I.T. and at the University of Southern California, learned that the National Science Foundation had passed his research proposal along to the National Security Agency, which then approached him about the possibility of providing some funds.

Dr. Adleman said he wanted no money from the agency. Since then he has been allowed to re-apply for money from the National Science Foundation.

THE NEW YORK POST
29 October 1980

CIA 'bought back' POWs from Vietcong

By KIERAN CROWLEY
A VIETNAM veteran claims the CIA bought back American POWs captured by the Vietcong with money, supplies and even ammunition that would be used against other GIs.

On one helicopter ransom mission in Vietnam, he said he personally delivered \$1 million in cash for the release of two high-ranking Navy pilots.

Michael Fox, a former Army helicopter crew chief, told The Post from his home in St. Paul, Minn.,

his unit successfully ransomed about 12 POWs.

"But we had five outfits all doing the same thing," said Fox, 35, a parks planner in the Twin Cities area.

Fox spent 19 months with the 525th Military Intelligence Group.

"Our job was to recover American POWs, by offering to buy them back with whatever it took — cash, or whatever else was handy.

"We had a \$5 million-a-month budget, courtesy of the CIA and the Army Dept."

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
27 October 1980

Spy modelled escape on Alcatraz

film shown in jail

By IAN BRODIE
in Los Angeles

AN American whose spying was of incalculable value to the Soviet Union says his escape from prison in January was made without Soviet help. He was serving a 40-year sentence imposed in 1977 for treason. Christopher Boyce, 27, made a telephone call to the Los Angeles offices of the New York Times. It was the first confirmed trace of him since his escape, despite an international manhunt.

He said he escaped from the medium-security prison at Lompoc, in California, by using a technique he learned from the film "Escape from Alcatraz," which was shown to prisoners a few weeks earlier.

Following the true story depicted in the film, Boyce fashioned a papier-mache dummy

to lead guards into thinking he was in bed asleep. He then crawled over two 10-foot high perimeter fences.

Boyce and a boyhood friend sold thousands of classified documents about United States spy satellites to the Russians in one of the worst security breaches since the 1953-45 war.

The son of a former FBI agent, Boyce worked for a Californian firm which built and operated satellites for the CIA.

"Knees shaking"

He said he turned spy because he was provoked by the discovery of alleged CIA interference in the affairs of Australia and other allies. The authorities said the pair spied for money, a total of \$77,000 in 18 months.

In his call to the newspaper, Boyce denied that he had any

assistance, Soviet or otherwise, in gaining his freedom.

"I did it by myself," he said. "My knees were shaking. I thought I was going to get a bullet in my head."

He said he hid in the rugged, brush-covered terrain around the prison for nearly three months, living off help from unidentified friends, while federal agents combed the area time after time.

Since then he had been "all over" in the United States and overseas, but would not disclose where he was calling from. The seven-minute call, from a public telephone, was to let his parents know he was alive.

After his jail escape, there was speculation that he had been helped in the same way as George Blake, the British spy who was serving 42 years for treason until he was spirited out of a London prison in a KGB plot and given sanctuary in the Soviet Union.

SYRACUSE HERALD-JOURNAL
21 October 1980

SU, CIA await word on documents request

By DALE KASLER

Attorneys for the Central Intelligence Agency and Syracuse University's student newspaper are awaiting a federal judge's decision on the newspaper's request for documents relating to alleged CIA activities on SU's campus.

The suit, filed by the Daily Orange in June 1979, says the CIA should release certain documents under the Freedom of Information Act. The CIA, which has asked for a judgment dismissing the federal complaint, says most documents requested by the newspaper are exempted from the FOI laws.

A spokesman for U.S. District Judge Howard G. Munson, who is presiding over the dispute, said today the matter won't be decided for a while.

The dispute arose in December 1977, when Daily Orange managing editor Howard Mansfield asked the CIA for information about the CIA's relationship with SU Professor William Coplin, information about an agency drug testing program, and any documents regarding CIA involvement on campus.

Most denied

However, the CIA failed to act on Mansfield's request, despite deadlines established by the FOI Act, according to the suit. So the newspaper sued the agency.

In November 1979, the newspaper and the Justice Department agreed to a stipulation under which the CIA agreed to process the request and give the newspaper an index of documents regarding contracts between the CIA and SU.

The agency processed the request, and in December told Gary Kelder, an attorney for the DO, that a few documents could be released, but most requests were denied because of exemptions to the FOI Act. And the CIA told Kelder it won't even confirm or deny the existence of some covert documents because that would damage national security.

Kelder said yesterday the information released was "unimportant, esoteric."

The newspaper has complained in briefs filed with the court that it hasn't been able to look at the documents to see if, in fact, their release would be a threat to national security.

Says access withheld

But in asking Munson to dismiss the suit, Justice Department attorneys said in May that "plaintiffs' oft-repeated lament that they have not yet had 'an opportunity' to conduct discovery is contradicted by the facts that they have had since mid-March to initiate any such discovery."

But Daan Braveman, the newspaper's other attorney, says the Daily Orange hasn't been able to conduct discovery — sort out which documents would damage national security or intelligence if released — because the CIA has not allowed the attorneys access to the files.

The attorneys have requested the CIA release an affidavit spelling out the nature of the documents. Also, the DO wants Judge Munson to examine the covert documents himself to see if they can be released without damaging the intelligence community.

In a recent development in the case, the newspaper's attorneys have amended the complaint to add two SU professors, Norman Balabanian and Allen Miller, as plaintiffs. Briefs filed in court say the CIA told Balabanian in 1975 his mail had been checked by the agency.

'Threat to freedom'

The professors claim the CIA's refusal to release the information violates academic freedom and the First Amendment. The CIA's refusal constitutes a "threat to academic freedom of all members of the academic community," according to a brief filed in April.

"Defendants (CIA) are creating the kind of suspicion and distrust which threatens the free exchange of ideas essential to an academic community," the brief said.

The brief noted the SU faculty in 1978 adopted a policy against letting professors conduct work for an intelligence agency under the guise of doing academic work.

Munson hasn't decided yet whether to allow the complaint to be amended to let the professors in as plaintiffs.

Mansfield's request for the information arose because of Coplin, director of public affairs in SU's Maxwell School of Citizenship. In his original letter asking the CIA for the documents, the managing editor said Coplin may have done research for the CIA regarding a system to predict revolutions "in banana republics."

Other connections probed

Mansfield asked for other information regarding possible SU-CIA connections, including the possibility that students were placed under surveillance or they were recruited by professors to spy on foreign countries during exchange programs. In addition, Mansfield asked if SU was involved in a drug testing program called MK ULTRA.

Mansfield, using CIA documents released under pressure by the Campaign to Stop Government Spying, had written an article for the Daily Orange in April 1978 describing how the CIA monitored political activity on SU's campus from 1967 to 1973.

10 October 1980

This won't scare them

THE NEW legislation which subjects intelligence agencies to congressional oversight will not set the spooks to trembling. It is a weak bill.

The measure was advocated as a means of restraining the CIA and FBI after exposure of their violations of law. Compromises were made, and in the course of trying to be kind to all sides, Congress could have opened loopholes that permit the old practices to be resumed.

The legislation reduces from eight to two — House and Senate intelligence committees — the number of congressional committees to which the intelligence agencies must report. It requires the CIA director to keep the two committees informed of all intelligence activities and of significant anticipated activities.

The bill gives the president authority to limit notification to only four designated members of

each committee, and gives him the authority, under "extraordinary circumstances," to withhold prior notice to anyone.

One man's extraordinary circumstance can be another man's routine circumstance. The term is an elastic one, and the president is empowered to stretch it to cover just about anything he wants it to cover. He could, if he wished to do so, conceal the illegal interference in the affairs of other nations, such as the CIA's conduct in Chile and its bribery of Italian officials.

With Watergate fresh in mind, some presidents would think long and hard before they would lend the office to such goings-on. We are less disturbed about the possibility of a rogue president than we are about members of the oversight committees who might be persuaded to overlook any transgression in the name of patriotism. Congressmen are like that.

THE RICHMOND NEWS LEADER
8 October 1980

'The Spike' and the Truth

Recently Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss published a best-selling novel entitled *The Spike*. Big Media treated it gingerly, and no wonder: de Borchgrave and Moss contend that some of what passes for news is not news but artfully planted Soviet propaganda generated in part at high levels of the U.S. government.

"Reviews have been few. Those that appeared generally have failed to grapple with *The Spike's* thrust, perhaps unintentionally. Even descriptions on best seller lists have been misleading. Wrote *The New York Times Book Review*: "Newsmen on the trail of a Soviet conspiracy." Said *The Washington Post's Book World*: "Spies and journalists mix and mingle in U.S. vs. USSR intelligence." Mix and mingle they do, but *The Spike* hardly ranks as an ordinary spy story. And consider: Had *The Spike* been wholly wrong, reviewers would have been quick to say so and trash it, rather than pussyfooting or ignoring it altogether.

Is *The Spike* fiction? Perhaps. Yet at least in Washington life has an eerie way of imitating art. Daniel Schorr, no fan of de Borchgrave and Moss, has written in the Leftist *New Republic*: "The villain of [*The Spike*]... is revealed as... a deputy director of the [National Security Council] and protege of the Vice President..."

Switching now to the real world:

(1) Retired Admiral Elmo Zumwalt has said David Aaron, a deputy assistant for national security affairs and Vice President Mondale's man on the National Security Council, engineered the disclosure of information about the Stealth aircraft technology to journalists. Stealth should make aircraft all but invisible to enemy radar; Defense Secretary Harold Brown apparently released information about Stealth to prove that President Carter really has not allowed the American arsenal to decline — that is, for political purposes. Some military men consider the leak a gross breach of security.

Jimmy Carter has refused to allow Aaron to give testimony in the congressional inquiry of the Stealth leak. In an apparent counterattack, Carter slammed a visible and effective Republican Congressman in Tennessee's Robin Beard, for revealing a defense secret — that the Soviets were cheating on SALT agreements by practicing the rapid re-loading of the silos housing their SS-18 missiles.

(2) The Central Intelligence Agency has encountered enormous difficulties in penetrating Soviet institutions. According to writer Edward Jay Epstein in *The New York Times Magazine*, the CIA entrapped a Soviet diplomat named Anatoly Filatov and set him to work for the United States in Moscow. Filatov was a classic mole — an agent working under deep cover for a nation opposed to his own. Accounts differ on how the Soviets caught on to Filatov, but catch on they did. His fate remains uncertain (he may be dead), and his loss was considered a major blow to American intelligence.

According to some accounts, Filatov's cover was blown in 1977 by Aaron during a careless conversation with a Rumanian diplomat. Aaron fiercely rejects that and other charges, and a CIA investigation has held him blameless. Yet Tennant Bagley, responsible in the mid-1960s for countering Soviet intelligence, told Epstein that "it takes a mole to catch a mole." According to Bagley, the two most successful CIA moles in Moscow were caught by the Soviets because they had been betrayed by moles working in American intelligence.

The Soviets have had great success in planting moles. One was Kim Philby, who became (a) a high-ranking member of British intelligence and (b) the British liaison with the CIA before exposure and escape to Moscow. Another was Richard Sorge. He masqueraded as a German newsman in Japan during the Second World War and told Stalin the day the Nazis would invade the Russian heartland; Stalin apparently did not believe him. Alger Hiss may have been still another.

These are major, known figures; lesser fry have been unmasked. What of those who continue to toil secretly? The very openness of Western societies works to the advantage of those who seek to destroy that openness. And rumors of Soviet moles near the top in Washington — notably near the top in the CIA — simply will not die.

We do not wish to imply that Aaron or anybody else connected with this murky business works for the Soviet Union. Yet plainly *something* odd has been going on. Perhaps congressional investigators should be asking questions along these lines: If Aaron did not burn Filatov, who did? Was it a mole, or was Filatov undone by a taste for high living? Do moles remain in place?

Aaron's defender, Daniel Schorr, points out that Aaron's case does parallel *The Spike* — a spy story that also traces certain lines of influence in government and the press. In addition to questions about the unfortunate Filatov, Americans would do well to seek answers to a larger question: How close does *The Spike* come to the truth?

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Jamaica

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JAMAICA

Voting Under the Gun

Mayhem and poverty figure in Seaga's big win

Supporters rang brass bells in celebration. Swooning youths snaked through dances of joy. Party workers tearfully embraced one another. With a sobriety that contrasted with the noisy jubilation all around him, Edward P.G. Seaga, leader of the Jamaica Labor Party, emerged into the spotlight at his Kingston campaign headquarters and claimed "the most dramatic electoral victory in the history of the country." Unlike much of the preceding campaign's rhetoric, this was no exaggeration.

The low-keyed former financial expert had just handed a devastating defeat to Prime Minister Michael N. Manley, the buoyant leader of the People's National Party. In a reversal of the landslide Manley won in the past two elections, the final count might give the Labor Party 51 of the 60 seats in the country's Parliament, a gain of 38 over the 1976 election. The People's Party was reduced from 47 to a mere 9. With that, the island nation had taken a sharp turn in its political course: away from Manley's pro-Cuban "democratic socialism" toward Seaga's pro-U.S. conservatism.

Since Seaga is a former official of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the outcome also seemed to be a vote of confidence in his ability to attract foreign investment. In his victory statement, in fact, Seaga said his first order of business would be to restore economic growth. And while he insisted that there would be no break in relations with Havana, he left little doubt that he planned to alter Jamaica's foreign policy. He asked the Cuban Ambassador, who had been accused of meddling in Jamaican affairs, to leave the island forthwith.

Seaga's landslide victory climaxed the most divisive and bloody campaign experienced by the island since it became independent from Britain in 1962. Fierce party loyalties divided the black ghettos of Kingston block by block, and many on both sides took to carrying guns. One of the casualties was Roy McGann, 43, a junior Cabinet minister and People's Party candidate for re-election, who happened to drive near a Labor Party rally; a fracas broke out, and McGann was shot and killed. Officials estimated that more than 500 people have been killed this year in fratricidal bloodletting.

On election day, steel-helmeted army troops, backed up by armored cars and helicopters, guarded polling places and patrolled the streets. Nonetheless, the gunfire echoed through the tough slums of Kingston all day long. The Kingston



Joyous supporters hoist Seaga aloft after his victory

Public Hospital, located in the center of the trouble, took in a dozen casualties. One young man, who had allegedly tried to steal a ballot box, had nearly been decapitated by a machete. The casualty toll just for the ten-hour polling period: three killed and 20 wounded.

The breeding ground of resentment, and the dominant issue throughout the campaign, was the country's dire economic crisis. One-third of the work force is unemployed, inflation is running at 30%, and the country's lack of foreign exchange is so acute that sugar, cooking oil, soap



Manley at rally in Morant Bay

A breeding ground of resentment

and rice are sometimes impossible to buy. Food shortages, in fact, provided Seaga with a key theme. "We are in a country that produces sugar, and you can't get a bowl of sugar." The election soon boiled down to a choice between proffered economic solutions: Manley's Third World socialism vs. Seaga's Western-backed free-enterprise monetarism. A cascade of reckless rhetoric from both parties also tried to turn the election into a false battleground between "godless Communism" and "sinister fascism." Manley's followers claimed that the CIA was supporting Seaga and covertly supplying him with arms, while Seaga's supporters characterized Manley as a closet revolutionary who would turn the island into another Cuba.

In the end it was clear that the voters blamed Manley for the country's economic morass. During his eight years as Prime Minister, the handsome, magnetic Manley, 55, scion of the island's most prominent political family, had made some significant contributions to Jamaica: a minimum wage, free education, equal pay for women, newly built health centers and 40,000 units of low-income housing. But endemic poverty remained, and critics charged his administration with woeful mismanagement. His warm *abra-zo* for Fidel Castro frightened the middle class as well as foreign investors. Soon Jamaica found itself with a severe brain drain and an inability to finance the increased cost of oil imports.

A Harvard graduate (in sociology), Seaga, 50, spent several years in a rural part of Jamaica studying child development and also wrote a book on the island's spiritualist cults. At the age of 29 he became the youngest member of the legislature, where at the time he was considered more leftist than Manley. He held Cabinet posts in both the Labor governments that ruled from 1962 to 1972; as Finance Minister he earned a reputation as a tough administrator, especially in plugging tax loopholes. He and his wife Mitsy, a former Miss Jamaica, have three children.

Last week Seaga dismissed accusations that over the years have painted him alternately as a Communist and a fascist. "The fact of the matter is that I am very much in the center," he said. His most immediate problem, he explained, would be to renegotiate the country's \$1.5 billion debt and deal with the country's virtual bankruptcy. As to warnings of continued violence, he expressed optimism that he would be able to bind the nation's wounds. "Once the decision has been made," he said, "the people who are the losers usually move out of the way because they don't have anything to fight for any more."

—By Marguerite Johnson.
Reported by Bernard Diederich and William

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
27 October 1980

THE INTELLIGENCE WAR SUBVERSION IN JAMAICA

By ROBERT MOSS

THE run-up to Jamaica's elections, due to be held on Thursday, has been marred by political thuggery and smear campaigning. The leaders of Mr Michael Manley's ruling People's National party (PNP), in particular, have sought to discredit their opponents as tools of Western imperialism and the CIA.

Yet two recent defectors, a Russian and a Cuban, who are both now living in the United States, have brought first-hand testimony to the far-reaching subversive activities of their countries' intelligence services in Jamaica and the Caribbean region as a whole.

They are Alexei Leshchouk, formerly a Second Secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Kingston, and Carlos Pedro Tariche Reina, a former official at the Cuban Embassy in Grenada.

Both men have again focused attention, in their debriefings, on the critical role that is currently being played by the Cuban Ambassador to Jamaica, Sr Armando Ulises Estrada Fernandez.

Sr Estrada is particularly close to Mr Manley's Minister for National Security, Mr Dudley Thompson, one of the Cubans' most faithful supporters in the Jamaican Government.

Secret meeting

Mr Thompson was among the select group of Central American Leftists who attended the secret meeting in Manimbo, Nicaragua, last July at which Dr Castro, and his chief of subversive operations, Sr Manuel Pineiro, laid out their revolutionary strategy for the region.

Despite previous exposés of Sr Estrada's intelligence functions, Mr Manley has consistently refused to withdraw the Cuban Ambassador's credentials or to launch any inquiry into Cuban undercover operations in Jamaica.

Between October, 1971, and June last year (when he was appointed Ambassador to Jamaica and to the Haitian Government-in-exile, a Castroite front) Sr Estrada ranked as deputy chief of the Cuban Communist party's Americas Department, responsible for supporting revolutionary groups in all parts of the Western hemisphere.

Born in 1935, Sr Estrada participated, in the wake of the Cuban revolution at the end of 1959 (in which he fought with a guerrilla group in the Trinidad Hill area) in an unsuccessful terrorist raid into the Dominican Republic.

He then took charge of running revolutionary networks inside Haiti, and adopted the matronymic of "Lescaille" in order to suggest to his agents in the "Voodoo Republic" that his mother had been Haitian.

Many pseudonyms

As an officer of Castro's secret service, the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), he was known to his colleagues under a series of pseudonyms, including Pantera Negra, or "Black Panther" (he is a dark mulatto) and El Pelado or "baldy" (he shaves off the fringe of hair around his bald pate).

From 1961 until 1971, according to Western intelligence sources, Sr Estrada served as chief of the DGI's Africa department. He is known to have made at least six trips to Africa during this period, and to have spent several months in the Soviet Union in 1968, where he attended a specially-tailored training course organised by the KGB.

In 1969, he was one of a team of DGI officers who accompanied a unit of the Palestine Liberation Organisation on a night raid into the Sinai Desert.

When Sr Manuel Pineiro was transferred from control of the DGI to the directorship of the newly-created Americas Department in 1971, Estrada—one of the Cuban spy chiefs' closest cronies—moved with him.

His main area of responsibility was the Caribbean basin, but he also travelled widely in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Far East.

Panamanian strong man. During the revolutionary upheavals in Nicaragua, Sr Estrada visited the Panamanian strong man, Gen Omar Torrijos, to expand the joint Cuban and Panamanian support programme for the Sandinista guerrillas. He visited the forward Sandinista command posts along the Costa Rican border (where senior members of his service like Sr Julian Lopez were serving as field advisers to the guerrillas).

Prior to his appointment as Ambassador to Jamaica, Sr Estrada visited the island in the company of his chief, Sr Pineiro, for meetings with leaders of the "New Jewel" movement from Grenada which eventually succeeded—with Cuban backing—in overthrowing the Prime Minister, Eric Gairy.

Sr Estrada is not publicly listed as a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist party, but is believed by Western analysts to be a secret member, like other top officers of Castro's intelligence services.

Reports from the defectors have confirmed the early assumption of informed Western observers that the reason for the transfer of this veteran undercover operative to the Embassy in Kingston was to orchestrate a covert action programme designed to maintain Mr Michael Manley in office and to convert Jamaica into a safe base for further Cuban probes in the Caribbean region.

Government-in-exile

Haitian emigres who have reached the United States provide one example of Sr Estrada's success in fulfilling the second part of that mission.

They claim that, at Estrada's instigation, Mr Manley and Mr Thompson have secretly permitted Haitian revolutionary exiles formerly based in Mexico, New York, Montreal and Cuba to set up a "Government-in-exile" in Kingston.

If Mr Manley wins this week's elections, it is likely that Jamaica's welcome for revolutionaries from the Caribbean area will be warmer still.

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FBI Trial

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U.S. Judge Instructs Jury in the Trial Of FBI Ex-Aides

United Press International

A federal judge yesterday told a jury to acquit two former top FBI officials if it finds they reasonably thought they had approval from acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray for "black bag" break-ins in 1972 and 1973.

But Chief U.S. District Court Judge William Bryant instructed the panel to find W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller guilty if it concludes they did not make that "mistake of law" — and failed to get specific approval from the president or attorney general for the break-ins.

After almost two hours of instructions, Bryant sent the jury into deliberations at 11:50 a.m. in the seven-week-old trial that included testimony from Richard Nixon and two of his attorneys general, John Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst.

Defense lawyers, who complained bitterly about Bryant's proposed jury instructions last week, expressed satisfaction at the final language that included the "mistake of law" clause that could exonerate Felt and Miller.

Felt, 67, and Miller, 56, are charged with conspiring to commit civil rights violations by approving break-ins — known as "black bag jobs" — at the New York and New Jersey homes of five friends and relatives of fugitive members of the radical Weather Underground. If convicted, each would face a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine.

Leaders of the anti-war group were linked to terrorist bombings, and in a dramatic courtroom appearance, Nixon testified he felt the break-ins were justified because the bombings were disrupting attempts to negotiate an end to the Vietnam war.

Nixon also testified he delegated authority for national security break-ins to the FBI.

In his 10 hours of testimony, Felt said he received "general approval" from Gray to authorize "bag jobs" in late 1972 to combat terrorism. Gray, who faces a separate trial on the same charges, denies approving the break-ins.

Break-In Jurors Asked to Convict Ex-F.B.I. Aides

Former Officials Approved 'Black Bag' Operations

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 4 — The prosecution asked a Federal jury today to "make the Constitution speak, and speak loudly," by finding two former officials of the Federal Bureau of Investigation guilty of conspiring to violate the rights of citizens.

John W. Nields Jr., the chief prosecutor, said in his closing argument that the two defendants, W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, had authorized agents to break into homes in 1972 and 1973, knowing that such "black bag jobs" would probably not be approved by the Supreme Court.

Mr. Nields told the jurors that they should judge Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller by the "law of the courts," not by the "secret law" under which the bureau had conducted "surreptitious entries" without search warrants for three decades.

"The F.B.I. broke into homes of the American people for 30 years and they kept it a secret from us and from Attorneys General," Mr. Nields said. "Then when we find out, they turn around and say, 'But nobody ever told us it was wrong.'"

'Bottom of Their Socks'

In fact, Mr. Nields said, the Federal agents "knew, from the tops of their heads to the bottom of their socks, when they were in somebody's home, looking through their personal belongings, that they were doing something wrong."

Defense lawyers told the jury, however, that Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller were just trying to do their jobs and had no way of knowing that they needed approval from the President or the Attorney General for the break-ins.

Thomas A. Kennelly, a lawyer for Mr. Miller, said, "At no time did Mr. Miller believe his actions constituted any criminal offense and neither did anybody else."

The purpose of the warrantless searches authorized by the defendants was to help find fugitive members of the Weather Underground organization, a militant antiwar group that had claimed responsibility for bombing the United States Capitol, the Pentagon and other public buildings.

Over 60 Witnesses Testified

More than 60 witnesses testified at the trial, which is in its eighth week before Judge William B. Bryant, Chief Judge of the Federal District Court here.

The defense contended that Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller did not need search warrants because they were engaged in a foreign intelligence investigation, collecting information about ties between the Weatherman group and foreign nations hostile to the United States.

Mr. Nields said that over the years citizens had achieved a right to be free in their homes from Government intrusions. He cited the Fourth Amendment, which forbids "unreasonable searches and seizures," and a 1966 bureau memorandum that said "black bag" operations were "clearly illegal."

Frank W. Dunham Jr., an attorney for Mr. Felt, said that his client had no way of knowing in 1972 that he was supposed to get the approval of the Attorney General or the President for each break-in. He said former President Richard M. Nixon and many former Justice Department officials had testified that the authority to approve break-ins "was already there in the office of the Director of the F.B.I."

Nobody Asked Kleindienst

He told the jury that Richard G. Kleindienst, the Attorney General at the time, would have approved the break-ins if he had been asked, but that nobody asked him.

Although J. Edgar Hoover, former Director of the bureau, ordered a halt to the use of break-ins in 1966 or 1967, Mr. Dunham said, Mr. Felt believed that there was a "policy change" in 1972. The attorney said his client believed that L. Patrick Gray 3d, then Acting Director of the bureau, "had turned back on what Mr. Hoover had previously turned off."

Mr. Kennelly said that the defendants did not apologize for the searches conducted secretly by the bureau because they were necessary "to preserve the basic institutions of our country and to attack and overcome its enemies." In the absence of any guidelines or standards, he said, Mr. Felt and Mr. Miller had to rely on the authority of their superiors and the past practice of the bureau.

The jury is expected to begin deliberations tomorrow after receiving instructions on the law from Judge Bryant.

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Nixon's Account: Final Chapter in FBI Aides' Trial

By Laura A. Kiernan
Washington Post Staff Writer

Flanked by Secret Service agents and deputy marshals, the witness entered the well of the courtroom, raised his right hand high and swore to tell the whole truth. His face and his hair had a familiar, powdered ghostly look appropriate for a figure just emerged from the past. He positioned himself in the witness chair, an American flag behind him.

The prosecutor, John W. Nields Jr., coolly addressed the first question to the witness, called by the government to testify at the conspiracy trial of two former FBI aides at the federal court here.

"... How are you employed?"

"I'm retired," the witness replied quietly.

"Were you once the president of the United States?"

"Yes."

For the next 46 minutes, interrupted only briefly by shouts from a few spectators who called him a "war criminal" and a "liar," Richard M. Nixon was once again in command, in the small, safe forum of a federal courtroom, explaining himself and the way things were when the country and his administration were torn by the Vietnam war.

The exchange between Nixon and the prosecutor was a colloquy between gentlemen, not an interrogation. The former president didn't sweat, he didn't shake his head defensively and he didn't say he wanted to make anything "perfectly clear." He did sit back in his chair and ramble, his chin resting in his hand, and at times he pounded his finger on the wooden bench in front of him to emphasize a point, reminding his spellbound audience more than once that there are things "we have to understand."

And when he had the chance, Nixon was more politician than witness, his testimony more like a speech.

"As we sit here today, grave as our problems are, we can be fortunate that the United States at least is at peace in the world. And President Carter has made that point and I think he has every right to make the point that during his period and term in office, we have not at least in armed combat lost — I think what — and we have to understand what the attitude was then."

"Now, even now, at a time of peace, we are concerned about international terrorism. We are concerned, for example, when we read what happened in France recently; in Paris, the anti-Israeli activity resulting in assassination, murder and bombing, what happened in Italy and so forth. We are concerned it might happen here."

"But all these concerns, I can assure you as one who went through it, were greatly magnified — I guess that's the proper word — by the fact that in 1969, 1970, 1971 we were at war...."

"I can assure you that — I think that, I hope that neither President Carter or Gov. Reagan if he should be president has to do what I had to do, what Franklin Roosevelt had to do —"

At that point, an impatient Chief Judge William B. Bryant interrupted and told defense lawyer Thomas A. Kennelly to ask his next question. But, Nixon continued.

"... what President Truman had to do, that is, write letters to people whose sons have been killed in war...."

Nixon's appearance last week, the first time he has testified in a courtroom since he left the White House in disgrace six years ago, was a stunning, final chapter in the trial of the two FBI aides, W. Mark Felt, once the bureau's No. 2 man, and Edward S. Miller, once chief of the domestic intelligence division. Both are charged with approving surreptitious entries — known in bureau parlance as black bag jobs — at the homes of friends and relatives of fugitive members of the radical Weather Underground in 1972 and 1973.

It had been rumored for weeks that the former president would appear as a witness for the defense, apparently anxious to testify that domestic terrorism, like that spawned by the Weathermen, hindered his efforts to end the war and justified efforts by the FBI — including secret entries — to penetrate that organization.

The defense, however, completed its case without calling the former president as a witness. Instead, the prosecution took up Nixon's offer to voluntarily testify for either side at the trial, a tactical decision by the government that could turn out to be a master stroke or a fatal blow to a delicate case, which is expected to go to the jury this week.

Nobody on the prosecution team is revealing any strategy, but a variety of courthouse observers have offered theories on the government's decision to have Nixon testify.

For one thing, Nields' questioning of the former president focused on Nixon's approval of the 1970 Huston plan, a domestic intelligence program aimed almost exclusively at the Weathermen and the Black Panther Party. The plan, Nixon testified, included illegal break-ins and electronic surveillance, but he said he believed his approval erased any illegalities. However, he then testified that he revoked his approval almost immediately, based on FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's objections.

That testimony could be key to the prosecution, which has argued that Felt and Miller needed direct approval from the president or from the attorney general to conduct the secret warrantless entries aimed at the Weathermen. There was no testimony from Nixon that he approved any entries other than those included in the Huston plan, which he withdrew. Nixon's statements capped testimony from four at-

But Nixon's testimony, as expected, was also strongly supportive of the defense argument that the FBI director had direct authority from the president to carry out break-ins in national security cases against targets with established connections to hostile foreign powers. Nixon testified that it was his belief that a succession of presidents, dating back to Franklin D. Roosevelt, had passed that authority to the FBI director and that approval from the attorney general was not needed.

Some observers felt, however, that no matter how helpful Nixon's testimony was for the defense, it was doomed to be clouded by the stigma of Watergate, the crimes the public associates with the Nixon administration and the notion that the president and his men felt they were above the law. By calling Nixon, these observers said, the prosecution had imposed that stigma on the defense, a risk the defense thought it had avoided by turning down Nixon's offer to testify for it.

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Republicans in the News

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The End of the Trail: Snapshots From One Night in November

Election Night in Washington is a special ritual, of adrenaline and ennui, of dread and delight. The night celebrations can have odd echoes: In 1976, when Iranian Ambassador Ardeshir Zahedi threw one of his lavish parties for the capital's glitterati, he took the campaign results with a philosophical shrug: "We have made out just as well with Democratic presidents—Kennedy and Johnson—as with Republican presidents." The former envoy was not available for comment Tuesday night but others were on the evening of the elephant's ecstasy. Washington scenes, Nov. 4, 1980.

The digital clock on the dashboard of Mayor Marion Barry's limousine flashes—8:02. The radio is on—"NBC is predicting Reagan the winner in Florida, Ohio, Indiana, Connecticut, Mississippi, Michigan, Kansas, North and South Dakota. Carter has won Georgia. . ."

"Jesus," says Barry. Almost matter-of-factly.

Barry arrives at WRC-TV to do local election analysis. He is told that Joe Fisher, the Democrat from Virginia's 10th district, is losing. Barry hikes his shoulders in surprise. "Glad I'm not running," he says, smiling. "Bad year for incumbents."

8:15 p.m.: NBC's projection of Reagan as winner echoes from half a dozen TV sets in the studio. Barry sits down, adjusts his microphone and gets ready to answer the question he will hear throughout this night of hopping from television stations to city council candidate headquarters.

"Will Reagan make a difference for the District of Columbia?" asks WRC's Jim Vance.

"I'm going to do all I can to reach out to him, to acquaint him and his staff with the District. . ."

At WJLA-TV, Paul Berry asks the mayor what it all means. "Naturally we're disappointed."

D.C. Delegate Walter Fauntroy appears in the WJLA studio. "We're in trouble," he says to Barry, then spots a reporter's notebook. "Oh—for the record. Our jurisdiction will be more affected by a fiscal conservative."

10:28 p.m.: "Turn that radio to WHUR," says Barry to plainclothes D.C. police detective Donald Brooks, who is riding in the front seat of the limo. "I've heard enough of national politics."

He stops at council member Charlene Drew Jarvis' headquarters on Georgia Avenue NW. Then he goes on to newly elected council member H.R. Crawford's headquarters on Pennsylvania Avenue SE. Yellow crepe paper is draped from the ceilings.

"Down at Democratic headquarters it's gloomy, gloomy," says Crawford. "Well, we're not gloomy in Ward 7." Cheers all around. "The Republicans are gonna get back at us," says Crawford, grinning. "They'll probably make Nixon head of the FBI. No—the CIA." Guffaws.

12:13 a.m.: Barry is talking to his wife on the phone from his car. "Any word on the Virginia race with Herb Harris? Wolf beat Fisher. Everybody's going down. Whole new scene. We've got four years of—I don't know. Something."

By the time he gets to council member John Wilson's party at the Mayflower, Barry finally gives in to the Reagan questions. "It will make my job 1,000 times harder," he says. "Because the District can only survive with massive federal support—which Reagan apparently doesn't believe in."

"Peace—and power," he says to someone on his way out.

"We ain't got power now," the reply comes back.

—Carla Hall

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 1

WALL STREET JOURNAL
6 November 1980

Taking the Reins

Reagan Forces Prepare To Assume Presidency; Snags Already Appear

Split Seen Between Factions
Of Ford and Hard-Liners
Over Personnel Policies

Looking for Some Democrats

By ALBERT R. HUNT

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — When Ronald Reagan was elected governor of California 14 years ago, his Press Secretary Lyn Nofziger has recalled, "the big question was, my God, what do we do now?"

Indeed, the early stages of the Reagan governorship were chaotic. A few bad appointments were made, some posts were left open and the sorting-out of policy priorities was disorganized.

Today, in the aftermath of the smashing Republican victory on Tuesday, aides insist that Mr. Reagan is much better prepared for the far tougher task of assuming the presidency. "A lot of preparation has been done, and it has been a very skilled effort," says Caspar Weinberger, a former Nixon Cabinet member and a confidant of the President-elect.

Two women, Mrs. Kirkpatrick and Mrs. Armstrong, are leading contenders for either top subcabinet foreign-policy jobs or perhaps United Nations ambassador, some Reagan aides believe. And Mr. Reagan's campaign manager, 67-year-old William Casey, could wind up with a top national-security post, such as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A1-8

THE WASHINGTON POST
6 November 1980

Repercussions

The People Spoke—and This Town Trembled

By Bill Prochnau

Washington Post Staff Writer

The federal city was in shell shock yesterday as if the Tories, soon to storm the city as they did in 1812, already were poised in the Virginia hills.

If the Reagan landslide and the Republican sweep of the Senate had one sure meaning, it was a repudiation of Washington, the capital of politics and bureaucracy. Beyond the Beltway, the people said they want things to change here, maybe even shook up in a serious way. Lots of important Washingtonians were already shuddering.

* * * *

At the venerable Army & Navy Club, retired officers chatted in quiet bliss while James Angleton, the former CIA counterintelligence chief who resigned in the post-Watergate investigation of the spook community, sat in his overcoat making a series of phone calls and relishing the defeat of Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who conducted the CIA probe.

EXCERPTED

ARTICLE APPEARING
ON PAGE 13THE BOSTON GLOBE
21 October 1980

An Azores tie

Top Reagan aide aided faction, didn't register

By Fred Strasser

and Brian McTigue
Special to The Globe

WASHINGTON — Ronald Reagan's chief foreign-policy adviser, Richard L. Allen, aided the right-wing secessionist movement in Portugal's Azores islands but did not register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The connection could prove an embarrassment if, as expected, Allen is named national security adviser in a Reagan White House.

In 1975, Allen sought US support for the secessionist movement in the Azores, but despite the counsel and contacts he offered the separatists, Allen did not register with the Justice Department under the Foreign Agents Registration Act — the law Billy Carter ran afoul of in his dealings with the Libyans.

Allen asserted in a 1977 interview that his involvement with the separatists from the mid-Atlantic Portuguese province did not require him to register as a foreign agent. He said, "I only made my facilities available for them to do whatever they wanted to do."

But a new consideration of Allen's Azores connections — which he admitted in 1977 had left him "cross-wise" with the State Department — raises some questions.

In 1976, several immigrants from the Azores who were active in the secessionist movement called Allen their Washington "liaison man."

Allen had been involved in the Azores as early as 1970. He had independently explored business possibilities, including an attempt on behalf of alleged swindler Robert Vesco to create an unregulated financial district in the islands. Members of the islands elite welcomed Allen's plans, which were blocked by the central government in Lisbon. But Allen had made friends.

Several of them, believing a change in government would enhance their fortunes, became backers of the right-wing secessionist movement, the Front for the Liberation of the Azores (FLA), which emerged in April 1975 after a left-wing military government toppled the remnants of the Salazar dictatorship.

It is unclear just when Allen began aiding the secessionist effort, though he met in Washington with one movement activist shortly after FLA was set up. His actions eventually triggered the ire of the State Department, where officials feared the rightist group and the secessionist plot could upset America's delicately poised policy toward Portugal, a policy that sought to avoid precipitous actions by Portugal's left or right.

To clear the air, Allen in 1976 wrote then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger what he said was a "full disclosure" of his involvement with the separatists. He acknowledged he had "not made known" to the State Department his role in arranging a meeting between secessionist leaders and the State Department in mid-summer of 1975. He also said he planned to continue to counsel the separatists.

Allen stressed in his Jan. 24, 1976, letter that he did not "represent the Azoreans or Azorean-Americans." He did not disclose, however, that a separatist group FLA had set up in Rhode Island, called the Comité 75, had paid for a trip Allen took to the islands two weeks before he wrote to Kissinger.

Allen was familiar with the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In 1974, he had registered as a \$60,000-a-year Washington lobbyist for Portuguese colonial interests in Africa. But he did not register for the FLA, although he advised separatists on lobbying Congress, ushered secessionist leaders around Capitol Hill and arranged meetings for FLA officials with State Department and intelligence officials.

Under the registration act, a "political consultant" advising a foreign group on how to influence US policy must register with the Department of Justice and periodically report his activities as an agent. He must register separately with each new group he serves. Allen denies having acted as an agent and denies knowing of FLA's existence until October 1975. But in March 1975, an Azorean acquaintance of Allen, Oscar Montepregado, arrived in the United States.

Traveling under a code name, "Tiago Sandin," Montepregado made contact with an Azorean expatriate revolutionary government based in Fall River, Mass., where many Azorean-Americans live. The "Clan-destine Government of the Azores-in-Exile" was seeking guns, money and recruits for an Azorean insurrection.

That "government" was directed by a French agent, Jean Raingeard, of the Secret Army Organization, which the CIA describes as a European-based rightist group engaged in "gun-running and mercenary recruitment." Montepregado traveled back and forth between Fall River and Washington, where he said he had contacts.

Allen denies any contact with Montepregado in 1975, although Montepregado says he met Allen in Washington. His contention is supported by others, including a former deputy Cabinet secretary.

Following spring and mid-summer meetings with Montepregado and another, unnamed, FLA activist, in November another FLA leader, Luis Vaz do Rego, arrived in the capitol to drum up support for the secessionist cause. Allen took Rego to the State Department. He arranged a meeting in the offices of his consulting firm, Potomac International Corp., between Rego and two CIA officers. (Rego reported the intelligence officials told him, "There is nothing we can do.") He also introduced Rego to a gathering of congressional aides on Capitol Hill.

Allen says he only made it possible for Rego and others to meet people; he did not, he insists, try to influence policy.

The separatists say, however, that Allen drafted a letter for their use in a congressional lobbying campaign. Written as if it originated with constituents, the letter was mimeographed, distributed at Azorean-American rallies, and sent to congressmen. It warned that failure to support the islands' independence would cost them votes.

The Foreign Agents Registration Act requires anyone disseminating material on behalf of a foreign group to influence US policy must not only register himself, but file copies with the Attorney General.

Rego, who delivered the letter to supporters of the FLA in New England, also told them Allen was to be their "liaison man in Washington." According to Rego, who is a Portuguese national, "It was easier to penetrate the State Department" because of Allen.

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Soviet Union

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6 November 1980

You Can't Take Momma

WHO IS WORTH SAVING? That question comes up in Washington whenever the subject of nuclear war is discussed. In a city where protocol means a lot, the difference between evacuating ground zero at government expense and being left behind to tough it out is not just a matter of life or death. It is a matter of status. Big power tensions abroad excite survival instincts in the nation's capital. And with everyone's thoughts now on

By William V. Thomas

doomsday, the aim in the highest political circles is not just living but living well.

Movers and shakers here never have been required to make personal sacrifices. So when the Defense Department recently warned that a Soviet missile attack could atomize Washington with as little as 12 minutes notice, few in the ranks of the policy elite seemed very concerned. After all, if anyone can count on getting out with time to spare, it's them.

What makes quick escape a pressing issue is the government's revised nuclear target list, a strategy that involves pinpointing civilian as well as military targets inside the Soviet Union. In addition to "conventional objectives," new plans specifically order the destruction of Russia's political leadership. Anticipating Moscow's likely reaction, the White House is wasting no time streamlining procedures to hustle U.S. leaders out of town in a hurry. "We spent years worrying about the vulnerability of our missiles to a Soviet first strike," said a government spokesman. But until now "nobody thought much about government officials."

In the event of a nuclear war, America's VIP salvation program, known as "Directive Fifty-eight," calls for evacuating the president, vice president, Cabinet heads, key members of Congress and the nine Supreme Court justices—all the higher ups necessary to start making laws as soon as the radiation clears. The rest of the country, needless to say, would have to fend for itself. Always ready with useful tips, Civil Defense authorities advise the average citizen to "take advantage of the wide ownership of private automobiles, the extensive highway systems, and the number of non-urban potential housing facilities to achieve crisis relocation." In other words, burn rubber to the sticks. And good luck finding gas.

It may strike some as unfair that the very people who scare up votes by talking about nuclear confrontation give themselves the best chance of surviving if one occurs. Of course, that isn't the way politicians see things. The late Hubert Humphrey, who, as vice president, had a special place reserved in the executive bunker, said he "didn't feel very good about it" since his wife, Muriel, had to be left behind. But HHH recognized a duty to

save himself for the good of the nation. "If you're drafted and you have to go to war," he said, "you can't take momma."

The main goal of "Directive Fifty-eight" is to keep a skeleton government in business, even if there's nothing left to govern. John W. Macy, head of the federal rescue mission and presumably one of the chosen, pointed out that logistics limit the effort to a precious few. However, "an atmosphere of rising tension before any attack," he added, would allow many more officials to be moved to safe hiding places.

A CIA study made public in 1976 concluded that the Russian civil defense program "is clearly intended as an element in over-all military superiority insuring the survival of Soviet society against its principal adversary, the United States." By contrast, the most efficient part of the American civil defense effort is designed to insure the survival of selected big wigs. The entire U.S. civil defense budget—exclusive of the government-in-exile plan, whose cost is a well-guarded secret—is \$100 million. That amounts to less than 50 cents for each man, woman and child.

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In one form or another, the policy of saving the leaders has been in effect for the past 30 years. Dwight Eisenhower, perhaps the most security-minded president in modern history, knew the value of keeping your best men alive to fight another day. During his administration, attendance by key personnel was required at practice evacuations. When Eisenhower gave the signal, officials would pile into their limousines and speed to the "nuclear retreat" at Mt. Weather, Virginia, 70 miles from Washington.

In one such dry run, Reagan adviser Ray Cline, who was there, remembers Ike showing up right behind a local farmer, whose pick-up truck got caught in the line of Cadillacs heading for safety. "The military and Secret Service went crazy when the farmer drove in," Mr. Cline said. Naturally, they threw him out "pretty quick."

The fact that most politicians rarely, if ever, have to live with the consequences of their mistakes sets them apart from farmers and other ordinary people. Being elected or appointed to high office means you never have to say you're sorry. While presidents and other top officials may have to live with the horrible possibility of nuclear holocaust, it must give them a certain sense of relief to know they won't have to take heat if worst comes to worst.

Though present accommodations at the various atomic hideaways are said to be far from deluxe, White House aides have confided that work on "enhancing" the shelters is already underway.

William V. Thomas writes for Congressional Quarterly.

How Much More Can Moscow Spend on Arms?

Experts Differ, But They Agree That Soviet Economic Flexibility Is Just One Consideration

ALWAYS an essential element in the Russian enigma, the riddle of military spending and Moscow's economic capacity to sustain even higher defense budgets has emerged as a central issue in the Presidential campaign. Debating with President Carter last week, Ronald Reagan contended that the Russians had "managed, in spite of all our attempts at arms limitation, to go forward with the biggest military buildup in the history of man." Mr. Reagan argued that an intensified buildup of American power was necessary. Mr. Carter charged that Mr. Reagan was inviting "a new round of the arms race." To explore the issue further, Richard Burt, a correspondent in the Washington bureau of *The New York Times* talked separately with two experts who hold different views on the Soviet economy and military spending, Franklyn Holzman and Abraham Becker. Mr. Holzman, a professor at Tufts University, is a fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Mr. Becker is an economist at the Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. Excerpts from those interviews follow.

Question. How big a burden on the Soviet economy is defense spending?

Mr. Becker. The C.I.A. estimates it is about 12 to 14 percent of the Soviet gross national product. This is a measure of the dedication of the Soviet leadership to defense, since that, or a similarly large bite, has been taken out of Soviet resources, relatively speaking, for 10 to 15 years. There's little doubt that this represents a burden on the economy because the military uses scarce, high-valued resources that could have alternative uses. This has contributed to maintaining a ceiling on Soviet economic growth and perhaps even to its retardation. To sustain the military, it has imposed priorities that have sacrificed the interests of the civilian sector.

Q. Does this imply that if the United States increases defense spending substantially, Moscow would have difficulty keeping pace?

A. Matching the United States would be difficult. If, for example, the Soviets felt compelled to increase their defense budget by 6 percent a year, instead of the current rate of 3 to 4 percent, they would face difficult choices. It would affect the possibilities for growth in investment and consumption rather heavily. The more you squeeze investment, the more you threaten the rather moderate growth of the Soviet economy. It is not at all clear that the Soviet economy's current growth rate would be sustainable even under a moderate rate of increase in defense spending.

Q. But if they feel threatened, don't the Soviet leaders possess the power to force their economy to match American increases?

A. If the Soviets faced the prospect of rapidly rising U.S. expenditure, one option would be to develop political and diplomatic tactics to restrain the U.S. That would probably be their first choice. Secondly, they would have to confront the possibility of increasing military spending and to face up to the prospect of tightening up on social discipline. There is still a third possibility, the most frightening one: If they really saw themselves as threatened to the point where vital national interests were at stake, they might want to take military action; but this does not seem likely.

Q. What are the Soviet political or diplomatic options for restraining American spending?

A. Historically, the Soviet view of détente brought together two different streams of thought. One put emphasis on controlling the arms race while the other stressed further military modernization. These views were reconciled by the perception that "the correlation of forces" is changing in Moscow's favor. In the Soviet view of détente, there was a requirement to try to constrain U.S. ability to utilize its vast productive potential to threaten the Soviet Union. I think the Soviets still feel that there is some possibility of going back to the détente atmosphere.

Q. What internal variables — such as a leadership succession crisis — are likely to influence Soviet military spending decisions?

A. Their present policy seems to be based on consensus. But if a successor to Brezhnev wanted to reallocate resources away from the military toward the civil sector for economic reasons, he would face very great difficulties. Reallocation issues affect the constellation of power in the Soviet Union, the core interests of the most powerful elements in the society. Moreover, at the beginning of a succession, the leader tends to be relatively weak and his capability to bring about so fundamental a transformation would be relatively insignificant. The Soviet military buildup and its stability over such a long period suggests that this structure is now so firmly anchored in the leadership decision-making apparatus that a successor would have a very difficult time trying to upset the policy.

Q. If the American defense effort continues to increase gradually, what changes do you expect in Soviet military spending? What could be the impact of arms control agreements, such as SALT II, on Soviet defense budgets?

A. The C.I.A. tells us that the Soviets will go ahead increasing their military spending by about 4 percent a year. If U.S. spending continues at the rate of the last four years, the size of the Soviet military program will continue to be larger because the gap between the size of American, as compared to Soviet, military spending has become so big. I think the Soviet leadership will continue to see the political utility of their military buildup and exploit it in ways which have already become familiar.

Q. With or without arms control?

A. Arms control has not just been a sop to those in the Soviet Union who have tried to control military spending for economic reasons. It was also seen as a means for restraining the growth of American military power. To that extent, the Soviets were probably quite satisfied with SALT I and surely are unhappy that SALT II has not been ratified. But I don't think that arms control has had any major impact on the rate of Soviet spending.

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Question. The Central Intelligence Agency estimates that the Soviet Union spends twice as much on defense in proportion to gross national product as the United States. What does this mean for their economy?

Mr. Holzman. The C.I.A. figures are virtually the only figures around. I'm not sure how accurate they are, but I think that in this case the general order of magnitude is correct. However, because the Soviet G.N.P. is 40 percent less than ours, their relative military burden is much higher. But there are deficiencies in this measurement, tending to understate the military burden in both nations. The military machine siphons away a large part of each nation's best research talent and skilled labor. This may be one reason both nations exhibit relatively low rates of economic growth.

Q. If the United States significantly expanded defense spending during the 1980's, could the Soviet Union keep up?

A. They would be very much inclined to try to match us. They would see a massive increase in U.S. spending as a threat and nations respond to threats heroically. For example, Israel's military spending has increased to about 30 percent of its G.N.P. and Egypt, a very poor nation, increased military spending to almost 40 percent of its G.N.P. in 1976. A second important factor is whether the Soviets would view an American spending increase as designed to reduce them from superiority over us to parity, or from parity to inferiority. Many people in this country, including the C.I.A. and the Pentagon, claim the Soviets have been outspending us by hundreds of billions of dollars during the 1970's, the so-called military expenditure gap. In my opinion, it's absolutely untrue, like (President John F.) Kennedy's missile gap and other mythical gaps. The C.I.A. estimates Soviet defense spending in dollars. Estimating costs of the huge Soviet army using our very high volunteer army pay scales makes the Soviet defense effort look very expensive. From the Soviet standpoint, however, it looks quite different. The Soviets don't make the spending comparison in dollars; they make it in rubles. In ruble prices, they look not at our army, but at our more advanced and higher quality weapons — very costly for them to produce because their industries are so much less efficient. To the Soviets, the U.S. defense effort looks larger than their own.

Q. What is the ability of their smaller economy to match an American military increase?

A. It would be very difficult, but they could probably do it. With an increase from the current growth rate of military spending, from 4 percent to 6 percent, there would be some strain on the labor force. But this would not hurt the Soviet economy in general. However, whether they could double the growth rate of their military budget would be questionable.

Q. How are they likely to react to planned moderate increases in American spending?

A. They will continue to increase defense spending at the present rate, at least. From their standpoint, they are competing not only with us but with the West plus Japan. America's NATO allies are spending more than \$80 billion a year on defense; in contrast, the six Soviet allies in Eastern Europe are spending less than \$20 billion a year. Furthermore, the Russians look to the east and, according to Defense Secretary Harold Brown, devote one-fifth of their military spending to countering China. So they don't really have room for complacency.

Q. What important internal factors are likely to influence Soviet military spending?

A. It looks like they will be able to muddle through, even though there's a tradeoff between the military and the growth of the domestic economy. An internal economic crisis is not likely to stop them from spending on the military. They are on the verge of a succession crisis that will remove a lot of the inertia from the system, making change in one direction or another direction easier. If we are threatening them, the Soviet "hawks" would probably have a bigger say, they might overreact, there might be a big buildup. On the other hand, if their economic difficulties are serious, and they're not threatened militarily, there might be a radical reduction in military spending. In previous succession

crises, new Soviet leaders have increased budgetary outlays for consumers.

Q. How would arms control affect Soviet defense spending?

A. An arms control agreement will always slow an arms race. SALT and other agreements have had a small moderating effect. The problem with SALT was that it set high ceilings on weapons so there was no large decrease in spending. However, there is an important advantage in this irrational world in having SALT. It puts a limit on what each nation can do. If you don't know what the other nation is going to do, there's a tendency to apply worst-case analyses. A lot of people feel that the Russians built up during the SALT negotiations. This has to be understood partly in terms of the fact that they were always behind then. We have parity now but that certainly wasn't the case in 1970. Once you get to parity, you have a better chance of making satisfactory agreements.

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From Allen & Unwin

New Book Sees CIA Study on Soviet Oil Production as a Self-Defeating Prophecy

Marshall I. Goldman, in *The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum*, disputes CIA reports that Soviet petroleum production will decline. He argues, that in fact, American intelligence gave the petroleum lobby in the Soviet Union the impetus it needed to seek funds to increase production.


What then is the real future for Soviet Petroleum? Professor Goldman believes it will continue to increase. He describes the measures being taken to overcome the problems between the Soviet planning system and the petroleum industry. He considers the USSR's possible use of more Western equipment suppliers; and most importantly, he weighs the political and economic implications of a Soviet Union with secure home-based energy suppliers.

The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum

Marshall I. Goldman

*Associate Director of the Russian
Research Center, Harvard
University and 1919 Professor of
Economics at Wellesley College*

Cloth-\$19.95 Paper-\$7.95
240 pages



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2 November 1980

TERROR: A SOVIET EXPORT

By Robert Moss

A tantalizing footnote in a bulky C.I.A. study of Soviet covert action dated Feb. 6 and presented to the House Select Committee on Intelligence early this year stated that the Soviet Union is spending roughly \$200 million a year on support of "national liberation" movements. What this means in practice is that the Soviet Union is currently giving arms, military training, funds and operational intelligence to organizations that often engage in terrorist acts against Western countries and nations whose governments are generally friendly to the West.

Official Soviet spokesmen of course deny that Moscow supports "terrorism," and they have issued vigorous denunciations of specific terrorist actions. Indeed, repeated Soviet claims that they are assisting "national liberation" forces fighting "imperialism" in the

Robert Moss, co-author of the novel, "The Spike," and a columnist for *The London Daily Telegraph*, lectures at the Royal College of Defense Studies in London and the NATO Defense College in Rome.

third world have led to much semantic confusion. One often hears, for example, that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Yet it remains clear that, whatever its political purposes, an armed political group engaged in bombing, sabotage, kidnapping or murder, especially of civilians, is practicing terrorism. The Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), for instance, which is openly supported by the Soviet Union, must be counted a terrorist organization — even if some prominent Western politicians choose to express the view that it is not.

The Soviet Union is keenly aware from its own historical experience that terrorism can contribute to the fatal weakening of a non-Communist regime. At the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism in 1979, Richard Pipes, professor of history at Harvard's Russian Research Center, suggested that the way revolutionary terrorism had undermined the czarist state in Russia and helped to create the conditions in which the Bolsheviks seized power had "left an indelible imprint on the minds of the Soviet leadership." In Professor Pipes's view, "nearly all the elements of Soviet global strategy are essentially an adaptation to foreign policy of methods which had been learned by the Bolsheviks and their allies when they were in the under-

ground fighting the imperial regime."

At a secret meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders held in Prague in August 1973, Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev paid tribute to the role of the "national liberation" movements in changing the "correlation of forces" in favor of "socialist countries." His speech — the contents of which became known to the British and American Governments through leaks by East European delegates — suggested that the Soviet Union is seeking to exploit terrorism as a calculated instrument of foreign policy. Since Brezhnev made his speech, the Soviet Union has notably increased its support for one national liberation movement, the P.L.O., which has become a coordinator of many international terrorist groups as well as a revolutionary vanguard in the Middle East.

According to Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit, the former chief of Israeli military intelligence, terrorists currently receive training at more than 40 establishments inside the Soviet Union. The most important training camps are located in the suburbs of Moscow, in Simferopol in the Crimea, and in the cities of Baku, Tashkent and Odessa. Similar camps have been set up in the satellite countries in Eastern Europe: for example, at Karlovy Vary and Doupov in Czechoslovakia, at Varna in Bulgaria, at Lake Varna in Hungary and near Finsterwalde in East Germany. Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, a former First Secretary at the Defense Ministry in Prague who defected in 1968, has reported that the training programs in his country are run under the direct supervision of the Soviet internal-security and intelligence agencies, the K.G.B. (Committee for State Security) and the G.R.U. (Soviet Military Intelligence). The same pattern seems to apply throughout the Soviet bloc, including Cuba. Soviet advisers are also deployed at terrorist

training camps in the Middle East.

Although precise figures are impossible to obtain, the number of recruits from the Arab world, Africa, Latin America, Western Europe and the Far East who have received instruction in the Soviet bloc in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, street fighting, assassination techniques and undercover operations is thought to total many thousands. Since 1974, according to P.L.O. defectors, more than 1,000 Palestinians alone have been trained in Soviet-bloc camps. Courses at the Soviet military academy near Simferopol have been attended by groups from rival wings of the P.L.O., including Al Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.) and the Palestine Liberation Front (P.L.F.). Zehdi Labib Terzi, the P.L.O.'s United Nations observer, said in a 1979 interview that "the Soviet Union, and all the socialist countries... open up their military academies to... our freedom fighters."

Some recruits are selected from the stream of foreigners invited to attend the Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University, under the supervision of the International Department of the Communist Party's Central Committee. A former professor from the university who now lives in Britain says that most of the faculty are career members of the K.G.B. or G.R.U., and that one of its main functions is to provide a center for the recruitment of agents and saboteurs from third-world countries.

The most famous alumnus of the Patrice Lumumba University is the Venezuelan terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, alias "Carlos." In an interview with a Paris-based Lebanese magazine, Carlos revealed that his passage to Moscow in 1968 was paid for by the Venezuelan Communist Party. By his own account, Carlos was expelled from Patrice Lumumba for loose living and indiscipline. However, West European intelligence sources maintain

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that this story was a blind, intended to camouflage the fact that Carlos had been recruited by the K.G.B. as a link man with international terrorist groups, especially the P.F.L.P. These sources also contend that Carlos had received training in Cuba — under K.G.B. Col. Victor Simonov at Camp Mantanzas outside Havana — even before his arrival in the Soviet Union.

Carlos achieved international notoriety after a series of operations — including the attempted murder of a prominent Jewish businessman, Joseph Edward Sieff, in London in December 1973 and rocket attacks on El Al aircraft at Paris's Orly Airport in 1973 — that culminated in the kidnapping of oil ministers from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna in December 1975. The French security service (D.S.T.) turned up evidence of the involvement of the Cuban intelligence service (D.G.I.) with the Carlos ring in Paris. This led to the expulsion from France of three D.G.I. officers operating undercover as cultural attachés at the Cuban Embassy. The D.S.T. also named a fourth Cuban intelligence officer in London who had allegedly served as a "control" for the Carlos team there.

There are other examples of terrorists trained in the Soviet bloc who have mounted attacks in Western Europe. In September 1975, Dutch police arrested four Syrians who belonged to a team that had planned to hijack a train carrying Soviet Jews; the Syrians confessed that they had been trained at a camp outside Moscow. Recently, a top security adviser in Rome, Constantino Belluscio, stated in an interview that "at least four of the most important Red Brigades chiefs and more than two dozen of their followers" had been trained at camps in Czechoslovakia. As early as 1972, the Italian security service gave the Minister of Defense the names of Italian terrorists known to have spent time in Czechoslovakia (especially at the K.G.B.-controlled

center at Karlovy Vary). The same report described contacts between left-wing Italian extremists and K.G.B. agents working undercover in the Soviet Embassy in Rome, and urged the expulsion of 22 accredited Soviet diplomats. Although both the Minister of Defense at the time, Franco Restivo, and Aldo Moro, Foreign Minister, agreed with this recommendation, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti vetoed it. (It was Aldo Moro, of course, who, after he became Prime Minister, was kidnapped and subsequently executed by the Red Brigades in 1978.)

Most weapons used by international terrorists originate in the Soviet bloc. It was a Czech-manufactured Skorpion machine pistol that was used to murder Aldo Moro. The P.F.L.P. has used Soviet-made heat-seeking Strela anti-aircraft missiles (SAM-7's) in a series of unsuccessful attempts to attack civilian airliners. Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (Z.A.P.U.) guerrillas made more effective use of SAM-7's in bringing down two civilian aircraft last year. In 1978, Spanish security officials discovered that a Basque nationalist group, Freedom for the Basque Homeland (E.T.A.), was using special new cartridges developed for the Czech Army that had never previously been used outside the Soviet bloc.

The fact that terrorist groups use Soviet-bloc weapons is not in itself evidence of direct Soviet support for their operations. Plenty of middlemen play a role in international arms traffic, one of the most prominent of these being Libya's volatile leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, who in 1976 concluded with the Soviet Union what was possibly the largest arms deal in history. According to the London-based Institute for the Study of Conflict, Libya served as a conduit for the delivery of Soviet-made arms to the Irish

Republican Army (I.R.A.), the Baader-Meinhof network in West Germany, the Japanese Red Army and the Arm of the Arab Revolution (Carlos's group), as well as to insurgents in Turkey, Yemen, Chile, the Philippines and other countries.

But Soviet-bloc countries have also made direct deliveries of arms to terrorist organizations. Zehdi Terzi has revealed that the P.L.O. receives "direct consignments" of arms and explosives from the Soviet Union. The inventory of Soviet-made weapons now in the possession of the P.L.O. includes T-34 and T-54 tanks, as well as medium artillery. According to Western intelligence sources, an agreement to maintain a direct arms pipeline was reached during the visit of Yasir Arafat, P.L.O. chairman, to Moscow in March 1979.

Non-Arab groups have also received direct consignments from the Soviet bloc. In October 1971, Dutch authorities intercepted a large shipment of weapons destined for the I.R.A. that had been supplied by the Czech arms-production agency, Omnipol. Last year, Greek police discovered a large cache of arms and explosives, including Kalashnikov rifles, Soviet-made assault grenades and bazookas, remote-control detonators and hundreds of kilos of plastique, in a villa in the suburbs of Athens. Investigators established that the cache was part of a larger shipment that had been smuggled overland by truck from Bulgaria and was intended for shipment to Turkey.

Evidence of Soviet-bloc involvement in providing operational intelligence — the selection of targets — for terrorists comes from the case of Panaiyotis Paschalis, a Greek Cypriot arrested by the Israeli security service as an East German agent in Tel Aviv on Jan. 19, 1978. Paschalis, a photo-journalist accredited to a Cypriot Communist newspa-

per and to East German television, told the Israelis that he had been sending exhaustive photographic dossiers on potential targets to Nicosia, Cyprus. From there, according to Paschalis (whom Israeli sources believe was a principal agent), the material was dispatched to East Berlin for inclusion in the central archives of the East German Ministry of State Security (M.f.S.), which uses the state

television company as a front for espionage. (The East German intelligence agency has not been alone in its use of media representatives. The K.G.B. and, at least until recently, the Central Intelligence Agency have found journalism an effective cover for espionage.)

The details of Paschalis's case lend credence to allegations by a number of Western intelligence sources that the Soviet Union has assigned the M.f.S. wide-ranging responsibilities in channeling intelligence support to international terrorists. On April 24, 1979, West German police arrested a seven-man P.L.O. hit team in West Berlin. The leader of the squad was Ali Shalbiya, a key lieutenant to the P.L.O.'s intelligence chief, Abu Iyad. Within days, two more P.L.O. squads were intercepted as they attempted to cross the Austrian and Dutch borders. Under questioning, the Palestinians confessed that their mission had been to blow up fuel depots and other major industrial installations in West Berlin. Senior officials in West Germany's Office for the Protection of the Constitution believe that the M.f.S. provided operational data for this abortive raid, as well as for other strikes against targets in the Federal Republic. (Last fall, West German security discovered that the M.f.S. was playing host in East Berlin to a P.L.O. team, code-named "Force 17.")

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As the role of East Germany waxes, the Soviet Union engages much of the sensitive work of providing liaison with terrorist groups to proxies. Most of the East European secret services, like the M.f.S., operate under complete Russian control; other surrogates, though not always so compliant, are equally valuable. The most important of these are Cuba, the radical Arab states and the ubiquitous P.L.O.

In the late 1960's, according to Orlando Castro Hidalgo, a defector from the Cuban intelligence service, the Soviet Union assigned Aleksandr A. Soldatov, its ambassador in Havana, the task of disciplining Fidel Castro, who had shown unwelcome signs of wishing to steer a course independent of Moscow's directives. Soldatov, whom Western intelligence sources believe is a career Soviet intelligence officer, used economic blackmail against Castro to force a purge of top officials in the

D.G.I. and the Defense Ministry who were viewed by Moscow as politically "unreliable." The Cuban secret service became, in effect, a Spanish-speaking department of Soviet intelligence. Its value to Moscow is suggested by the fact that, according to a report by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, the D.G.I. is the only satellite secret service that is known, in recent years, to have received from Moscow a financial subsidy specifically to enable it to extend its operations abroad.

According to Western intelligence sources, insurgents from around the world have received training in Cuban camps. And Cuba supplies more than just training. A C.I.A. report, dated May 2, 1979, and leaked to the press last year, details covert Cuban backing — including arms, training and military and intelligence field advisers — for the Sandinist National Liberation Front in Nicaragua which played a dominant role in overthrowing the Government of the late President Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979), and for similar

movements in Guatemala and Honduras. Soviet post-mortems on the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua suggest that Moscow is leaning toward a more aggressive policy of supporting terrorism at America's back door, using Cuba as its principal surrogate.

The close ties that now exist between Moscow and the P.L.O. date from the summer of 1974, when Yasir Arafat visited Moscow as an official guest. Today, regular liaison between Moscow and the P.L.O. leadership is assured though the Soviet Embassy in Beirut, which provides cover for the most important K.G.B. station in the Middle East. (Of the 88 accredited Soviet diplomats in Beirut, 37 have been identified by Western intelligence sources as K.G.B. or G.R.U. officers.) The key link man between Moscow and the P.L.O. is Aleksandr Soldatov, the Soviet Ambassador, who arrived in Lebanon in September 1974.

Working closely with Yasir Arafat, Soldatov has succeeded in building a trustworthiness: "Soviet lobby" inside the P.L.O., whose leadership is divided among rival factions, some of them more sympathetic to the Islamic fundamentalists of the Moslem Brotherhood, the conservative monarchies of the Persian Gulf or to the Chinese than to the Soviet Union. Defectors from the P.L.O. and high-level prisoners interrogated by the Israelis have revealed that Arafat currently meets with Soldatov on an average of once a week, and confers with the Soviet Ambassador before authorizing any major terrorist operation or political maneuver. Western diplomats who have monitored Soldatov's activities in Beirut found that, in the space of six weeks earlier this year, the two men had at least seven lengthy consultations. According to intelligence sources, during one meeting, on March 15, Arafat reported on the results of a visit that the P.L.O. intelligence chief, Abu Iyad, had just

made to Kuwait, Aden and Yemen. These sources say that Abu Iyad had investigated the prospects for expanding covert P.L.O. activity among the Palestinian communities in the Gulf area. P.L.O. cells in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates are subordinate to the organization's operations department in Beirut, which is headed by Abu Jihad. Western intelligence sources believe that Abu Jihad's departure on a secret visit to Moscow two days after the March 15 meeting between Arafat and Soldatov was connected with a plan to increase efforts to destabilize the conservative Arab monarchies of the Gulf.

Vladimir N. Sakharov, a Middle East specialist who defected from the K.G.B. in 1971, has described the increasing Soviet investment in subversive operations in the Arabian peninsula. While based in Sana, Yemen, Sakharov served as translator at meetings between K.G.B. officers and "top operatives of insurgent groups operating on the Arabian peninsula and in the Persian Gulf emirates." He has also reported that some of the terrorists who participated in the professionally organized seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca last November — an attack that rocked national and international confidence in the stability of the Saudi royal house — were "among those [he] had heard mentioned as part of the Soviet-sponsored People's Front of the Arabian Peninsula." West European intelligence sources have disclosed that some of the Mecca insurgents (whose battle plan called for subsequent uprisings in Medina, Taif and Riyadh) had been trained by Cuban and East German instructors at a camp near Lahej in South Yemen, where the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has taken its recruits in the past. Soviet interest in the P.L.O. as a revolutionary vanguard in the Gulf is heightened by its failure to date to form an effective Saudi Communist Party; one was set up in 1975, but it has remained semidormant.

The P.L.O. currently enjoys close ties with some of the Iranian revolutionary leaders who rose to power with the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. One of the most intriguing delegates at the Fatah conference in Damascus at the end of May, for example, was Arbas-Agha Zahani whose nom de guerre is Abu Sharif. He was then the head of the Ayatollah's Revolutionary Guards, or *Pasdaran Enghelab*, a post he resigned in a power play in June that was designed to weaken the position of the relatively "moderate" President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. (Abu Sharif was subsequently reappointed deputy chief of the *Pasdaran Enghelab*.) Abu Sharif rose to a position of influence thanks to the patronage of the present Iranian Defense Minister, Mustafa Chamran. Like Yasir Arafat, both Abu Sharif and Mustafa Chamran are fervent advocates of exporting Iran's Islamic revolution to the rest of the Middle East — in particular, to the conservative states of the Arab Gulf.

Abu Sharif's links with Arafat, Abu Jihad and other key figures in the P.L.O. leadership date back to the early 1970's, when he attended a guerrilla training course at a Fatah camp in Lebanon. After the downfall of the Shah, Abu Sharif and Mustafa Chamran relied heavily on their P.L.O. contacts for help in setting up a new secret police to replace the Shah's notorious Savak. A special P.L.O. unit, whose members had received intelligence training in the Soviet Union, was dispatched to Teheran to assist in rooting out "counterrevolutionaries." Abu Sharif repaid his personal debt to the P.L.O. by successfully lobbying — with the backing of, among others, one of the Ayatollah's grandsons — for a big Iranian contribution to the Palestinian war chest and for the dispatch of more than 200 Iranian "volunteers" to fight with the P.L.O. in southern Lebanon.

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The current head of the P.L.O. network in Iran is Hani al-Hassan, alias Abu Hassan, a Jordanian citizen who belongs to Arafat's inner circle of advisers. Before he was sent to Teheran, Abu Hassan served as deputy chief of Fatah's security department. He enjoys a remarkable entree to Khomeini and other key members of the Iranian regime — so much so that one Western diplomat suggests that the P.L.O. envoy should be counted as one of the most influential men in Teheran. In light of the Ayatollah's antipathy toward the Soviet Union, it is doubtful whether Abu Hassan could have attained this position if he were considered to be one of the K.G.B.'s trusted men in the P.L.O. What makes close ties with the Soviet Union even less likely is

the fact that Abu Hassan received his military training in China.

Nonetheless, Abu Hassan's activities in Teheran have served the Soviet Union well. On Oct. 12, 1979, a senior P.L.O. delegation, including Abu Jihad, Abu Walid (who is in charge of "special operations") and Col. Husni Ghazi al-Hussein, arrived in Teheran. Iranian officials who have fled the country claim that this P.L.O. team, in a series of meetings with Iranian revolutionary leaders arranged by Abu Hassan, proposed the assault on the United States Embassy that took place on Nov. 4. It is impossible to prove or disprove this report in the absence of further details. But Western European intelligence sources report that Abu Hassan was one of the counselors who urged Khomeini to reject any prompt resolution of the embassy occupation, and that the original assault force included several Iranians who had been trained at Palestinian camps in Lebanon. In any case, the prolonged embassy crisis serves Soviet interests by helping to divert the attention of Iran's Moslem revolutionaries from the repression of their co-religionists in neighboring Afghanistan, and to steer Khomeini's revolution in a vehemently anti-American direction.

After the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in September, the P.L.O. continued to lean toward the Iranians, raising the possibility that the Palestinians might cause trouble for some of the Arab states, notably Jordan, which had sided with Iraq. (There are some 1,127,000 Palestinians in Jordan and 180,000 in Saudi Arabia.)



The usefulness of the P.L.O. to the Soviet Union extends far beyond the Middle East. At Fatah and P.F.L.P. training camps in Lebanon, Syria, South Yemen and Libya — where many Soviet-bloc instructors can be found — there is a steady intake of insurgents from places as far afield as the Netherlands and Australia.

A list of foreign recruits who attended training courses at a single Fatah camp in 1979 gives a vivid idea of the broad compass of the P.L.O.'s selection of its educable friends. According to reliable Arab sources, non-Arabs trained at Hamouriya (south of Damascus) included four members of West Germany's Red Army Faction, six Red Brigades members from Italy, three Spaniards connected with the Rasque E.T.A., four Red Star

Army members from Japan, 32 Filipinos and other Asians, 180 Africans, 170 Iranians, 28 Argentinians (mostly from the guerrilla organization called the Montonero Peronist Movement), 12 Brazilians — many of them members of the extreme-left Popular Revolutionary Vanguard, and 130 Turks, including members of the People's Liberation Army.

The P.L.O. and the Soviet Union shared an interest in stepping up pressure on Suleyman Demirel's moderately conservative Government in Ankara, which had shown signs of dissociating itself from the pro-P.L.O. line taken by the previous Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, and of strengthening its ties with NATO. According to Turkish security sources, Turkish extremists were trained in guerrilla tactics at Simferopol in the Crimea, and were provided with weapons smuggled across the Syrian border by

the P.L.O. The upsurge of terrorism in Turkey provided the pretext for the recent military coup, and the stringent martial-law measures imposed by the high command had an immediate effect of curbing the level of guerrilla activities.

The relationship of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine with underground revolutionary groups in Italy extends beyond use of the Italians' transit facilities and logistical backup for Palestinian operations. On Nov. 7, 1979, Italian police stopped a speeding car on a highway along the Adriatic coast. They found that the occupants of the vehicle, both members of the Red Brigades, were carrying two SAM-7 missiles. The weapons had originated with the P.F.L.P., which had smuggled them into the country on board a small Syrian-crewed ship, the Sidon. Italian security experts believe that the captured SAM-7's were destined for use against Italian political targets, even though the P.F.L.P. put out a statement claiming the arms were being transported elsewhere. This would fit in with the conclusion of West German investigators that the murderers of Italy's Prime Minister Aldo Moro had Palestinian connections.

Former C.I.A. officers claim that the P.L.O. has consulted with the Cuban secret service in developing its training programs in the Middle East. With Cuban encouragement, Fatah and the P.F.L.P. have concluded parallel cooperation agreements with Latin American terrorist groups, including the umbrella organization, the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta. The first P.L.O. representative to São Paulo, Robhi Halloum, had his career abruptly interrupted when he was arrested in Amsterdam in 1972 and found to be escorting a large consignment of firearms that he had planned to smuggle into Brazil.



Soviet influence over the P.L.O. should not be confused with outright control. Fatah is not a Marxist-Leninist organization, and the P.F.L.P. — which is — has criticized the

Soviet Union in the past for being overly cautious. Similarly, when the P.L.O. — or any other group — launches a terrorist attack with Soviet-trained commandos and Soviet-supplied arms, it does not always follow that the attack was ordered or even sanctioned by the U.S.S.R. Yasir Arafat has been prepared to work very closely with the Soviet Union, but the relationship has been the focus for bitter controversy within the Palestinian movement. Despite these divisions, the P.L.O. showed itself ready to apologize for Moscow's actions following the invasion of Afghanistan.

The overall picture of Soviet support for international terrorism is necessarily incomplete, and is likely to remain so unless Ambassador Aleksandr Soldatov, or another operative of the same caliber, should decide to defect to the West and recount his story.

Few Western Governments have shown much interest in putting the issue of Soviet-sponsored terrorism on their foreign-policy agendas. The reasons for this apparent coyness are debatable. For those who persist in the hope that, despite Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership is committed to "détente," there may be a natural psychological reluctance to face facts that are so much at odds with expectations. For those who have convinced themselves that recognition of the P.L.O. and the creation of a Palestinian state are the keys to peace in the Middle East and guaranteed oil at reasonable prices, there may be a similar disinclination to deal with evidence that points the other way. Yet, irrespective of partisan or ideological leanings, any realistic debate over the appropriate policies the United States and the West should adopt toward the Soviet Union must include discussion of Soviet sponsorship of terrorism. ■

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Iran - Iraq

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3 November 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

Iraqis Trained for Chemical Warfare

Despite the near-hysterical rhetoric emanating from both Iran and Iraq, the desert conflict so far has been less than total war. But U.S. intelligence analysts say there is danger of escalation in a particularly gruesome area: chemical warfare.

The reason chemical or biological weapons have not been used may be simply that the balance of terror in this field is clearly in Iraq's favor, and the Iraqis have been doing well enough with conventional forces—so far. But if the fortunes of war should change dramatically, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein may decide to stave off disaster by resorting to chemical weapons.

Iran has done relatively little to develop chemical warfare capability, or defense against such attacks. But Hussein is known to consider chemicals a useful military tool. Iraq's modest stockpile of chemical-biological weapons is a legacy from its years as a military client of the Soviet Union.

The Iraqis began actively acquiring a chemical warfare potential in the mid-1970s. As a secret Defense Intelligence Agency report put it, Iraq embarked on "an aggressive chemical-biological-radiological program," including the construction of training facilities . . . modeled after Soviet CBR installations."

Intelligence sources discovered "at least 15 locations" in Iraq where CBR obstacle courses had been constructed with Russian help. The extent of

these training facilities "highlights the importance [the Iraqis] place on being prepared to operate in a contaminated environment," one secret report states.

The obstacle courses were used as part of general Iraqi army training. "In these areas, troops are instructed to bypass or move through contaminated obstacles and perform normal combat duties while wearing protective clothing," the report notes.

"Each Iraqi division has an organic chemical company that is equipped primarily with Soviet-manufactured materiel such as the truck-mounted ARS12 and DDA53 decontamination apparatus," an intelligence report states. "As in the Soviet Army, the Iraqi ground force has a chemical branch, and CBR doctrine is most likely based on Soviet concepts."

Before relations with the Kremlin cooled following Hussein's crackdown on Iraqi communists in 1978, the Soviets reportedly supplied small amounts of chemical warfare agents for training use.

The Iraqis had "no known chemical warfare production capability, although the technological base required to produce nerve agent exists, and an attempt has reportedly been made to do so," according to an intelligence analysis. It concludes ominously:

"The Iraqis realize that, once acquired, weapons of this type could be

used against . . . potential adversaries, such as Iran and Israel. Numerous weapons systems already in the Iraqi inventory are capable of delivering CBR munitions, which would have to be externally supplied."

Intelligence sources told my associate Dale Van Atta that the French, who replaced the Russians as Iraq's major military supplier, have not provided chemical weapons. But the Iraqis have built up a small stockpile on their own.

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A year of the ayatollah, and politics, and captivity

By Robert J. Rosenthal
Inquirer Staff Writer

The marble corridors and offices of the State Department were empty in the early morning hours of Nov. 4, 1979. Shortly before 3 a.m. the department's operations center, staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, began receiving frantic messages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran.

The department had known that tens of thousands of Iranians would be marching in the streets of Tehran that Sunday morning. They were marking the first anniversary of the day when the deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's troops had fired upon protesting students at the University of Tehran. The bloodshed

had given new impetus to the revolution.

In Tehran, the marchers' route took them down Taleghani Avenue and past the U.S. Embassy compound at No. 260.

Armed Iranian guards stood outside, watching impassively. Inside, seven of the embassy's 14 Marine guards were on duty. The others were in their living quarters across the street, some asleep, all unarmed. They were not allowed to take their weapons outside the compound.

As the marchers went by the embassy, a pack of between 500 and 1,000 broke off from the main body and ran past the passive revolutionary guards. They burst into the compound. Most of them wore badges

with the portrait of the country's spiritual — and at the time, its only effective political — leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

American officials retreated, barricading themselves in the embassy's main building where they tried to burn and shred documents. It was then that the operations room nearly 5,000 miles away in Washington began receiving the frantic messages.

Marine guards tossed a few tear gas canisters at the mob. But they were under orders not to shoot at the crowd. Within minutes they, along with the embassy staff, were overwhelmed, bound, blindfolded and taken prisoner.

The marines who had been off-duty across the street

compound also were captured, bound and brought to the ambassador's residence.

At the same time, six embassy employees working in a newly constructed consular building slipped out of a rear door. Once in the street, they scattered. Three months later, the six, after hiding out in diplomatic residences, escaped using forged documents identifying them as Canadian diplomats.

By 3:45 a.m. Philadelphia time, the militants controlled the whole embassy. They immediately strung a banner in the compound. It read: "Khomeini struggles. Carter Trembles."

Then they announced that they would hold the embassy, and their

hostages, until the United States returned the shah to Iran to stand trial. Ten days earlier, the Carter administration, against the advice of its own experts, had permitted the exiled shah to enter the United States for treatment of cancer of the lymph nodes.

In the holy city of Qom, a spokesman for Khomeini issued a brief statement that Sunday afternoon. The takeover, the spokesman said, had the personal support of the ayatollah.

Khomeini, the imam — holy man — who had led the revolution that toppled the shah's regime the preceding February, earlier, had attacked the United States for admitting the shah. He had said he hoped the re-

ports that the shah was dying of cancer proved true. In a broadcast, Khomeini had said: "The shah is dying."

"In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate, America, America, death to your plots! Our martyrs' blood is dripping from your claws! The United States is enemy number one of humanity and the Iranian people. Under the pretext that the deposed shah is ill, it has harbored him."

President Carter was at Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, that weekend. By daybreak Sunday the State Department was setting up a special Iran task force. Carter was thoroughly briefed. He decided that he was not needed in

Washington. Eight months earlier the embassy in Tehran had been occupied by a mob. The Iranians had stayed for less than a day. There was no reason yet to think this would be different. So Carter decided not to interrupt his weekend.

As the President and the rest of America slept that night, another day had already begun in Iran. The hostages, bound hand and foot, blindfolded and isolated, could hear thousands of Iranians chanting in the streets. The crowd repeated two chants over and over: "Death to America" and "The embassy must be destroyed."

On Tuesday, it will be a year since the militant students seized the U.S. Embassy and took 63 Americans hostage. Another three diplomats at the Foreign Ministry were detained by the government. A presidential campaign has come and all but gone. A baseball season has come and gone. So has a Super Bowl championship. It has been a year of designer jeans, of Bo Derek, balloon bouquets, and custom-made roller skates.

For the families of the 52 hostages still held, the anguish of the uncertainty continues. It has been a teasing year, manipulated and dominated by the dark-browed, white-bearded, stone-eyed Khomeini.

It has been a year that has shown the American people that the United States, for all its sophistication, military might and advanced technology, can still be held powerless in the grip of cultures and leaders Americans know little about and make little effort to understand.

The hostages, depicted in cartoons as pawns so many times, have become precisely that. They will be released soon. They won't be released. Ups and downs. Hopes raised and hopes dashed.

For half a year, from Nov. 4 to April 24, when a brave but perhaps ill-conceived attempt to rescue the hostages foundered in an Iranian sandstorm, the hostage issue dominated the American news media.

CONTINUED

Then, little news

Then for months it almost seemed as if there was no hostage issue. The Carter administration decided that such daily attention was counterproductive. Its officials stopped making daily pronouncements. The news dwindled. Even in Tehran, the crowds no longer gathered daily before the embassy to chant, "Death to Satan America."

But in the last few weeks, with Iran under attack by its neighbor, Iraq, the media, perhaps led on by hopeful officials, have redirected the cameras and headlines at the hostages.

For weeks Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan and his aides murmured that President Carter would have an "October surprise": the release of the hostages just before the election. The White House and the State Department have urged caution, wary of past "break-throughs" that never materialized.

Shortly after the hostages were seized, U.S. intelligence sources put together a beige booklet entitled, "Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran: His Personality and Political Behavior." The study was put together for Carter. The profile of the Iranian leader, then 79, said that age might affect his thought processes and physical strength but noted that "there are also elements of a very crafty and very self-righteous individual."

Taunts from ayatollah

From the very first day of the seizure of the embassy, the ayatollah gave credibility and support to the militants. He labeled the embassy a "den of espionage," said Carter lacked the guts to do anything about the takeover, and termed him an "enemy of humanity."

His taunting digs were picked up by the demonstrators outside the embassy. To the captured Americans, the chants often became the only outside reality. The crowds burned American flags; the militants used one to carry trash.

The enemy was America, symbolized by the hostages and President Carter. Carter had allowed the shah into the United States on Oct. 23, 1979, for cancer treatment at a New York hospital. Two of those who had lobbied the administration for the shah to be admitted were former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Chase Manhattan chairman David Rockefeller. Kissinger, as President Richard M. Nixon's national security adviser and, later, secretary of state, had been an fervent admirer and supporter of the shah.

The White House and the State Department had known that admitting the shah into the United States would infuriate the revolutionary government — and, more important, the clerics led by Khomeini — in Iran.

There had been warnings from experts in the Tehran embassy that the compound and its staff would be a vulnerable target for angry demonstrators. Hundreds of Americans were called home. But, for the most part, the warnings were ignored.

After the seizure of the hostages the President said he had "no regrets and apologies" about his decision to admit the shah.

What the United States intelligence community, the President and some of his closest advisers grossly underestimated was the hatred the Iranian people felt for the shah. His arrival in the United States gave Khomeini a target and symbol, America, for rhetorical zealotry. It reaffirmed Iranian fears of American interference and imperialism. The ayatollah stoked those fears and aroused Islamic nationalism not only in Iran but throughout the Islamic world.

EXCERPTED

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The Days Dwindled Down

The fate of the hostages remained the last major election issue

Nov. 4 is not just Election Day. It is also the first anniversary of the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. In the final stages of the presidential campaign, suspense over whether the hostages would still be captive or finally free on Nov. 4 increasingly preoccupied Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and the American electorate.

On Sunday, the Iranian Parliament finally took steps that could release the hostages. But no matter when or how it is finally resolved, the hostage crisis so dominated the pre-election news that there was a danger that voters would let their judgment of Carter's whole presidency be inordinately affected by one important but in many ways aberrant issue: his effort to free 52 fellow citizens approaching their 52nd week in the hands of a foreign regime that is in a state of both war and near anarchy.


Carter knew that. Reagan knew it too. So did the powers that be in Iran. Last week, largely because the American election was at hand, the bizarre interplay between U.S. domestic politics and the pandemonium that passes for government in Iran became more feverish, preoccupying and unpredictable than ever. Carter hoped that the hostages would be released before Election Day but not soon enough for them to reach the U.S. and the press. The reason: White House fears that some hostages would denounce the President for the way he handled the crisis.

For several weeks there had been rumors that a hostage deal was imminent, and its broad outlines were well known. On Sept. 12, the Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini pared down to four the conditions for the hostages' freedom: return of the late Shah's fortune, unfreezing of Iranian assets in U.S. banks, cancellation of U.S. claims against Iran, and guarantees of non-interference in Iranian affairs. The fourth condition was the easiest for the U.S. to meet, since the Carter Administration had always denied any intention of thwarting the Iranian revolution.

The other three conditions all had to do with cash, which Iran badly needs to shore up its ailing economy and to wage its six-week-old war with Iraq. The Administration agreed in principle to release the money and find ways of cutting through the legal tangles (see BUSINESS).

Another American inducement for Iran to free the hostages emerged during indirect negotiations conducted through Algerian, Swiss and other intermediaries:

the battle-weary Iranian military, which relies on American equipment purchased under the Shah, desperately needs spare parts that the U.S. has refused to deliver because of the hostage crisis. The Administration has said that once the hostages are free, Iran can have about \$100 million worth of "nonlethal" military equipment that it has already paid for (e.g., spare parts for C-130 transport aircraft). So far, Iran has remained vague about whether it also insists on immediate



delivery of guns, ammunition and other weaponry it had bought.

With the U.S. willing to pay Khomeini's price, and with the war against Iraq going badly, the Majlis, or Iranian parliament, finally seemed to be moving to seal the deal. The leaders of the Majlis realized how much Carter was hoping for a pre-election breakthrough. They knew they would lose bargaining leverage against the U.S. once the election was past no matter who was the victor: Carter would have less political reason to press for a deal, and Reagan's general attitude is uncompromising.

Everything seemed set. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis, was sure he had enough support

to put the deal to a vote. Back in Washington even the most skeptical officials were optimistic. But they, like Rafsanjani himself, neglected to reckon with the ingenuity of Iran's diehards. On Thursday, the day set for the debate, about 70 deputies stayed home or refused to take their seats, preventing a quorum of 180 and thus blocking a vote.

One deputy in attendance was the Ayatullah Sadegh Khalkhali, the notorious "hanging judge" who has ordered over a hundred people executed. He, like most of the senior mullahs, supported the deal. Cursing the organizers of the boycott as "truant kids," he pounded his fists so hard on his desk that his turban fell off.

The assembly was adjourned until Sunday—only two days before the U.S. election. Khomeini's heir apparent, the Ayatullah Hussein Ali Montazeri, denounced the parliamentary obstructionists for "shirking their duty" to "the revolutionary people of Iran." Montazeri virtually ordered the Majlis to act. Official Iranian propaganda was already billing the compromise as a surrender by the U.S. Meanwhile, a U.S. Air Force ambulance plane was standing by in West Germany.

At the Sunday session, the Majlis deputies voted by what an official announcement called a "decisive majority" to approve Khomeini's four conditions as the basis for the hostages' release. Word reached Carter while he was campaigning in the Midwest, and he abruptly returned to Washington to consult with his top foreign-policy advisers on the precise meaning of the Majlis vote.

White House Press Secretary Jody Powell promised that the U.S. response would be consistent with American law, national interest, national honor and concern for the hostages' safety. He added that the President was "encouraged" but cautioned against another burst of optimism. The Administration was worried both about contributing to hopes that might still be dashed and also about provoking the Iranians with anything that seemed like gloating.

Only a few days earlier, one member of the Administration had inexplicably made a remark that surely would not help matters. Interviewed by the Shreveport, La., Journal, White House Congressional Liaison Frank Moore asserted that Khomeini was dying of cancer of the colon. Moore added that after Khomeini's death

there would probably be a takeover by Western military elements in Tehran. A charter member of Carter's Georgian inner circle, Moore once remarked with disarming self-deprecation that the President probably should have fired him. Carter may have wished last week he had taken that advice.

The White House denied Moore's statements. Officials in the intelligence community were puzzled and angered by the incident; they know Khomeini to be suffering from heart trouble but believe that he is otherwise quite healthy.

The Carter Administration had other, more substantial worries about its handling of the hostage crisis. Coming to terms with Iran and sending along military supplies, even of the nonlethal variety, could seriously complicate American relations with the conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf that are backing Iraq in the war. Last week Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Republic warned they might reduce oil production if the U.S. resumed military supplies to Iran.

The Carter Administration hopes to persuade the Saudis and other Gulf Arabs that selling Iran spare parts and thus enabling it to hold its own in the war with Iraq serves Western and Saudi interests in two ways. First, as long as Iran can defend itself, it is less likely to collapse into factionalism and secessionism, which the Soviet Union would almost certainly try to exploit. Second, American policymakers believe it would not necessarily be good news for the West or for Saudi Arabia if Iraq's President Saddam Hussein were to emerge a

clear winner from the present war. He has made it plain that he wants to become the strongman and protector of the Gulf. U.S. officials fear that, as a radical and a revolutionary, Saddam Hussein would be an inspiring figure to dissident elements inside Saudi Arabia and the smaller sheikhdoms of the area.

Therefore, while the White House and State Department would still prefer a quick cease-fire in the war, the Administration would not be sorry to see the Iranian military, with all its made-in-the-U.S.A. hardware, bloody Saddam Hussein and set back his ambitions.

A tilt toward Iran could also complicate U.S.-Soviet relations, as the Moscow press warned repeatedly last week. But as long as the U.S. is contemplating only limited and nonlethal resupply of Iran—and as long as Iraq relies on Soviet arms—Administration officials are reasonably confident that the U.S. can remain tech-

nically neutral and that the Kremlin will limit its response to finger-wagging editorials and propaganda.

In the end, the most troublesome aspect of the hostage crisis is the way it has obtruded on American presidential politics. When the Carter Administration's handling of Iran is stripped of all its disclaimers, the conclusion is starkly unavoidable that one of the dominant goals of U.S. policy during an extremely dangerous war has been to get the hostages out before Election Day. That conclusion stands even if Carter is given the benefit of the doubt for having the most humane motives along with his transparently political ones. Carter and Reagan muted their references to the hostages on the hustings last week, but aides to both candidates were edgy. The Reagan camp feared a boost for Carter if the hostages were released, while the President's men feared a backlash against the Administration for its concessions to Iran even if the hostages were freed.

The U.S. has been living with a national humiliation since the day the hostages were seized. It would be compounded if, a year later, the results of the voting in the U.S. presidential elections were to depend to any significant degree on a vote, or even the prospect of a vote, by the fanatically anti-American Majlis 6,500 miles away. The exact impact of Iran's blackmail on the U.S. political process may be as difficult to assess after Nov. 4 as it was to predict before, but the humiliation is no less acute. —By Strabo Talbot. Reported by Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington



U.S. Air Force flying ambulance standing by in West Germany

CINCINNATI POST

8 October 1980

Visitor to Iran says hostages in CIA

By Len Penix
Post Staff Reporter

Linda Brown narrowed her eyes and said the American hostages in Iran are "murderers and destroyers."

Ms. Brown, 27, arrived in Cincinnati Tuesday after returning from Iran on her way to her home in San Francisco, Calif.

SHE LEFT her 4-year-old daughter with friends, packed her bags, and went to Iran for three months, spending three weeks of that time in jail.

Affiliated with the Committee to Support the Iranian Revolution, Ms. Brown said her visit in Iran convinced her that Americans are "concerned but confused" about the hostage situation.

"Who are the hostages? They have nothing to do with me," she said. "Most of them are high-ranking CIA officials. The CIA has never, and never will, represent the best interests of the American people. They are murderers and destroyers—these

are the hostages."

Ms. Brown, who will air her views on the Iranian situation in a speech this Saturday at Tangelman University Center at University of Cincinnati, said she supports the students who took over the embassy in Tehran, almost a year ago.

She said members of the CIA working at the embassy were plotting to stop the growing revolution in Iran after the Shah had been ousted.

MS. BROWN ARRIVED in Iran

in April, the day after eight servicemen were killed in a helicopter crash during the United States' aborted attempt to free the hostages.

"I was arrested on my way back from Kurdistan," she said, "by anti-revolutionary elements in the government."

She stayed in a prison near Tehran for three weeks before being released and later permitted to leave the country. She was not harmed.

PORTLAND OBSERVER (OR)
25 September 1980

Activist charges CIA connection

By Nyewusi Askari

(The following is an interview with Laura Brown, who spent three months in Iran, including three weeks in an Iranian jail.)

Observer: *How and why did you become personally involved with the Iran situation?*

Brown: I got involved with the Iran situation last November, when Iran took the hostages and kicked the U.S. out. There was a tremendous amount of racist hysterical war budding coming out of the American press about Iran. It brought many people forward to find out what was really happening with the Iranian revolution. I took a great chance as an American representative going to Iran to support the revolution and find out about it.

Observer: *What were those first days like?*

Brown: Well, they were pretty confusing. I went to the U.S. Embassy, a 27-acre compound that the Iranians view as an symbol of the past 27 years of U.S. domination of Iran. Once inside, it was like walking through a science fiction story. There was sophisticated communications equipment with direct link-ups to U.S. satellites, computers, code room and vaults full of CIA documents. In other words, the Iranians students holding the hostages gave me a first hand account of information that had been denied the Western press.

For example, there are Chinese American CIA agents operating in Iran, disguised as Chinese from the Mainland. They have Chinese passports, identifications, the whole works, yet these are people from places like Washington, D.C., California and other cities in America. The Iranians are very aware of this "Chinese connection".

Observer: *What were the reactions of the Iranian government to your presence in Iran?*

Brown: Very supportive. I was able to personally meet with several high Iranian officials within the Iranian government. For example, I was given an exclusive interview with Bani Sadr, a meeting with Sanjabi, foreign advisor to Bani Sadr and others.

Observer: *How did your arrest come about and why?*

Brown: I visited Kurdistan, which is the storm center of the revolution. While there, I became involved with the people and everyday was a whirlwind of non-stop political discussion and activity. I talked with Peshmergas which means literally, "those ready to die for their freedom", who were the front line fighters in this war. Upon leaving Kurdistan, I was arrested by trained Savak agents and sent to prison for being in Kurdistan and for allegedly being a U.S. spy. I was really caught up in a complicated power struggle in Iran and arrested by forces with close relations with the U.S. government as a means to end my visit.

Observer: *What are the Iranians feeling toward the American hostages?*

Brown: The Iranians pretty much know that not all the 50 hostages are spies. They know which ones are big spies and which ones aren't.

Observer: *When do you think the hostage crisis will be resolved?*

Brown: I don't see how the hostage crisis will be resolved until the international crisis is resolved. Many people talk about the hostages, but what they're talking about is U.S. imperialism. One thing the Iranians said was, hey look, we've never had anything but

good feelings toward the American people. They now have a sense of disappointment. The media in the U.S. is unbelievable in coming out with their racist nonsense about Iran.

Observer: *What was the Iranian reaction to the U.S. Abortive rescue attempt?*

Brown: Very interesting. The first reaction was, "We don't know if the fighting is to take place in the morning or the afternoon. The failed rescue attempt was first announced through use of a warning siren, which is normally used to signal war. When the Iranians heard the siren, they prepared themselves for war. There was no doubt on the part of the Iranians, that if the U. S. so much as took one step into Tehran, a full-scale war would have taken place.

Observer: *Do you think the people of Iran are moving in the right direction, from your viewpoint as an observer?*

Brown: Yes. I don't think they were doing that before. At this moment, the reactionary right, which is supported by the U.S. is defaulting power. Its a very big contradiction for the U.S. because they deny it. The fact that you hear of men being shot, of women being put in prison...you hear these things and don't realize that the people who are responsible, are U.S. backed. These are the people who wanted to bring the Shah back or put in a Shah like regime.

The revolution in Iran is whole. The people are extremely political minded. They see themselves as part of a whole world process whereby people are going to rise up to throw off the bonds of oppression.

An example of this is...when the Miami rebellion happened; there were thousands of Iranians in the streets in support of the Blacks in Miami. The moment the news hit the Iranian press, Iranians took to the street. People talked to me about the situation and expressed their support for the Blacks struggle for justice in the U.S. One of the amazing things is, you can walk down certain streets in Tehran, and see big posters of men like Malcolm X, Martin Luther Kings, etc. Before going to Iran, I didn't know of these things or this level of political awareness among the Iranian people about the Black struggle in America.

Observer: What was your impression of the Ramsey Clark episode in Iran?

Brown: My feeling is that the conference was pretty clear on the fact that he was there representing the CIA...

Observer: Would you explain what conference you are talking about?

Brown: Yes. It was a conference to investigate U.S. crimes in Iran. Anyway, the Iranian people knew he was there representing the CIA, and had no interest in supporting the Iranian revolution and never had. He was just representing a different style of approach to the situation. His speech was something. I was present and it's too bad everyone in America didn't

get to hear it. He did an excellent job of manipulation.

Observer: What are some of the things we didn't hear?

Brown: What his line was, that the U. S. had made some goofs, that it was just a matter of mistakes as if opposed to realizing that it was a concentrated policy, that the U.S. has been doing for forty years all over the world. It's no different from Chile or anywhere else.

He said, "Well, the U.S. made some goofs," and he began crying real tears for the Iranian people. But you see, the Iranian people are not hardly interested in tears. Some felt sorry for him. I didn't...not one bit. I'm inspired by the man who feels pride. Clark didn't show any.

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10 November 1980

The Spook on the Left

Defending the liberalism of the CIA

The Jekyll and Hyde of the CIA. That was what many people said about Cord Meyer when it was revealed in the late 1960s that he was in charge of covertly financing American students who attended rallies abroad. How, his critics asked, could one of the nation's most dedicated liberals end up manipulating American youth? Easy enough, explains Meyer, now 60, in *Facing Reality* (Harper & Row; \$15.95), an absorbing, balanced account of his life and the agency he served for 26 years. His liberal values and his vision of one world under a rule of law are perfectly compatible with the aims of the CIA. The agency went astray, he says, when it ignored its liberal purposes.

In his first idealistic venture, the youthful Meyer's career came close to being cut short. As a Marine lieutenant in Guam in World War II, he lost his left eye to a Japanese grenade. After his recovery, Meyer searched for a career in which he could "do all that is in my small power to make the future for which [his comrades] died an improvement upon the past." He first joined the U.S. delegation involved in setting up the United Nations, but was disillusioned when nations refused to surrender any sovereignty. Then he tried to build support for supranational control of nuclear arms by becoming president of the United World Federalists. He was introduced to strong-arm Communist tactics when he helped form the American Veterans Committee. His effort to block a KGB takeover taught him "never to underestimate the strength of a disciplined Communist minority." But his victory also persuaded him that "Communists can be outorganized and outvoted without dismantling the democratic freedoms and rights of our society."

In 1951, during the Korean War, Meyer joined the CIA, whose director, Allen Dulles, welcomed talent of considerable ideological variety and then protected his employees from the Red-baiting of Joe McCarthy. That was fortunate for Meyer because he was soon accused of being a Communist agent by people whose identity he never learned. He was temporarily suspended from the CIA, but he was eventually cleared and rose to become director of covert operations or, as it was known to its critics, "dirty tricks."

For Meyer, dirty tricks consisted mostly of secretly funding democratic, largely left-of-center groups in Western Europe and elsewhere who were opposed by organizations financed by the Soviet Union. With White House backing, Meyer provided cash for the National Student Association, which was greatly outgunned by Soviet-backed student groups at highly publicized youth festivals in Europe. Meyer insists that the CIA never tried to

licitly known, he was attacked by the right for promoting a liberal organization and by the left for supposedly corrupting college students. The effort was worth it, contends Meyer, because the vigorous defense of democratic values by the American students discouraged the Soviets from organizing any more propagandistic festivals.

Meyer is just as clear on what constitutes unacceptable CIA behavior and cites President Nixon's decision in 1970 to try to prevent Marxist Salvador Allende from becoming Chile's elected President. The CIA opposed the operation, but was ordered by the White House to go ahead anyway. The plan failed and, in the process, the Chilean military was encouraged to violate its traditional respect for constitutional democracy. Even more offensive, says Meyer, was the effort undertaken by the Kennedy brothers to as-



Meyer: a case for "dirty tricks"

sassinate Fidel Castro. Though Meyer was not aware of the project at the time, he asserts that the CIA should have flatly refused to participate. "This was one issue in which resignation was preferable to disciplined obedience."

Forced into retirement by the Carter Administration, which wanted to de-emphasize covert operations, Meyer maintains that such actions are needed more than ever to combat an increasingly adventuresome Soviet policy. Contrary to conventional thinking, says Meyer, the more the Soviet economy falters, the more likely are its leaders to embark on overseas moves to cover up their domestic failures. He cites Nicaragua in 1979 as an area where timely CIA assistance to moderate forces opposing Dictator Anastasio Somoza might have prevented the Cuban-backed Sandinistas from seizing power. Writes Meyer: "So long as the Soviets remain committed to continuing massive intervention, the policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries is

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 30THE BOSTON GLOBE
5 November 1980

CIA involved in Egypt, too, author claims

WORLD PRESS / By ALAN BERGER

At a time when each side in the Iran-Iraq war is blaming the United States for conspiring with the other, the October issue of an Arab magazine, *The Middle East*, featured an interview with a former CIA operative, Wilbur Eveland. His revelations about American covert actions in the Mideast over the last three decades could be read as a partial confirmation of the region's most paranoid suspicions. Eveland's disclosures included bungled American efforts to give covert aid to the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and to organize a coup d'etat in Syria; assassination schemes; American involvement in Lebanon's civil war; and a secret deal with Israel to allow the Israelis to develop a nuclear capability.

Eveland is the author of a book released last June entitled "Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East." He told the monthly that, although it could not prevent publication, the CIA, using powers granted to the agency by recent court rulings, "took the opportunity to delay the book." During the 1950s, Eveland said, he had been "on loan" to the CIA from alternately the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department. For five years, he said, he was former CIA Director Allen Dulles' "main representative in the Middle East."

Eveland explained the CIA's approach to Nasser as an aftermath of the agency's success in restoring the shah to power in Iran. "This was taken as an indication that the CIA could change governments and direct national affairs in foreign countries," he said. Although the CIA had not been involved in the Egyptian coup of 1952 that overthrew King Farouk, Eveland recalled, "We needed an Arab leader, and when it became clear that Nasser was the man behind the coup, Kermit 'Kim' Roosevelt (the CIA operative who had organized the shah's return) befriended him. He was a natural Arab leader, and they thought he would be tractable. But he turned out to have some ideas of his own."

Eveland, who said he was in charge of the Mideast for the secretary of defense's office at the time, said there was general consensus against western military aid to regional governments. "The feeling was that you don't make peace by arming people," he explained. "Egypt was a separate case, however, because of the huge British base at Suez. Egypt wanted the 80,000 British troops out. In return for Egypt's agreeing that the British would be able to return in the event of war, President Eisenhower made an unprecedented decision to grant military aid to the Egyptian army. This was a courageous act because the Israeli lobby was very much against it, but it was top-secret. To keep Nasser in business until we could get through all the formalities, the CIA was authorized to make \$3 million in covert funds available to him. This was for the purchase of uniforms, cars, etc., to keep his officers loyal until we could get some real equipment out there."

Eveland made it clear he regarded the manner of the actual payoff as an instance of how the CIA's style of arrogant bravado affected US policy, and perhaps also the course of history. "If it had been handled properly," he said, "there wouldn't have been a foul-up. But Miles Copeland, who was in charge of this, was one of Kim's acolytes. He gave a suitcase containing \$3 million to one of Nasser's assistants with a message that 'this was for Gamal.' Nasser was insulted because he thought it was a personal bribe. But he didn't want to give the money back, so he built a massive monument — it became a television tower — opposite the Nile Hilton hotel. It is commonly referred to as 'Roosevelt's erection.'"

A few years later, in the post-Suez period of 1957-58, Eveland recounted, "a number of different plans were developed to remove Nasser. The Lebanese, the Iraqis and the Jordanians were involved with us, and to a limited extent the Saudis. On the other hand, the CIA dealt unilaterally with the Mossad (Israel's secret service) and the British, and French were also coordinating with us."

But all these activities were founded on nothing more than the rash conclusions of two men: then-Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, Allen Dulles, who was in charge of the CIA. As Eveland recalled the incident: "Our actions sprang from a casual statement by Eisenhower which the Dulles brothers misinterpreted. He had said, 'We ought to get rid of this problem in Egypt,' meaning we should improve relations with Nasser. But once Eisenhower found out assassinations teams were being fielded, he explained that he had not wanted to kill Nasser."

Another aftereffect of the 1956 Suez crisis, according to Eveland, was a covert bargain between the United States and Israel. "One of the conditions for the Israeli withdrawal from Egypt in 1956 was an arrangement between the US and Israel, a very secret one. We would assist, or at least not interfere, in their acquiring a nuclear capability and then not admit that we were aware of it."

CONTINUED

Eveland linked this arrangement to the CIA's close working relationship with the Mossad, although he pointed out that "the connection is less close since the mid-70s, when former CIA chief Bill Callby fired James Angleton (head of CIA counterintelligence) or forced him to resign. Angleton was the man with Mossad. It (the connection) certainly still exists, and I was told in 1959 by Allen Dulles that it was going to be expanded. I said that this seems to me like putting a mouse in charge of cheese. Israeli reports about Communist or nationalist penetration in Arab states would be biased."

Summarizing the lessons of his experience, Eveland said, "I'm not anti-CIA: I think we need a stronger CIA. But I think most of its members ought to be in Washington and few overseas." Explaining what he meant by "America's failure in the Middle East," Eveland told the Arab magazine: "We looked at the area as a source of oil and a platform for military bases. Those were our first two priorities. A poor third was the aspiration of the people. If we put the people first and the oil second, then we won't need the other, the military bases."

ARTICLE
ON PAGE

NEW YORK TIMES
20 (BOOK REVIEW) 2 November 1980

"The most personal, the most interesting, and the most far-reaching of all the books on intelligence published in recent years."

—WALTER LAQUEUR

Blending historical reflection with historical analysis, a man who served the CIA with distinction for 26 years takes a provocative look at the agency's goals and policies, successes and failures in the past three decades. Cord Meyer re-traces his own colorful career—as the wounded veteran who became the first President of the United World Federalists, the intelligence official who became the target of McCarthyite accusations—and provides unprecedented inside accounts of the facts behind the headlines: the CIA's real role in Chile, how it attempted to avoid involvement in Watergate, how the KGB's

international network functions, how it outmaneuvered the U.S. in Angola, and much more. "Anyone interested in the real world of intelligence should not fail to read this fact-packed book."

—RICHARD HELMS

"As autobiography it is moving, as history illuminating, as assessment alarming, and as advocacy convincing. It deserves to be read carefully."

—SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,
*Director, Harvard University
Center for International Affairs*

"Must reading for every serious student of today's world situation."

—PAUL H. NITZE



FACING REALITY

FROM WORLD FEDERALISM
TO THE CIA
CORD MEYER

THE INDEPENDENT (ANDERSON, S.C.)
15 October 1980

Retired Spy Reflects On CIA's Early Years

By Tony Kiss
Staff Writer

Jack Maury never planned to be a professional spy.

"I was a lawyer who was in the Marines during World War II," he said. "I was assigned to Russian intelligence.

"When I came back home, they were starting the CIA and I joined."

Maury spent 28 years with the agency — 19 of them as a cloak-and-dagger spy.

He was given a cover: to distribute supplies to the Soviets. He was given an assignment: to gather as much information on the U.S.S.R. as possible.

Maury retired from the CIA in 1974 and today is a writer, lecturer and a consultant to the Pentagon.

Tuesday, he was in Anderson to speak to the Metropolitan Dinner Club.

"I was a charter member of the CIA — one of the first agents to join," the white-haired former spy said. "We all had these romantic ideas about spying. We were naive, but terribly enthusiastic."

Now, Maury said, the CIA is different. Agents have lost their enthusiasm.

"It's a lot more relaxed and informal," he said. "They are a lot more bureaucratic but professional today."

Maury's CIA cover was to dole out military and civilian supplies to the Russians, through the Lend-Lease program.

"It was a full-time job," he said. "A cover is no good unless it is for real. But I moonlighted as an intelligence officer."

He was locked up and questioned a few times by the Soviets.

"They knew we had some intelligence connections," he said. "I never felt I was in great danger.

"But I got nervous a few times. The danger is something you always have in the back of your head."

Maury dislikes CIA agents who leave the agency, write a book and reveal classified information.

"It's a serious problem," he said, recalling a fellow agent who was assassinated in Greece after papers there revealed his identity in a story.

"There is no legal recourse against these people," he said. "Most of them are guys who wanted to run the show."

"They ran into problems, left the agency and then, just for spite, decided to go public."

Although the CIA's image has been tainted in recent years, Maury insists it is needed.

"When you are no longer the biggest kid on the block, like the U.S., you have to rely on wits to make up for lack of muscle," he explained. "Without the CIA, this country is like a blind giant, stumbling in a mine field."



Staff Photo by Patrick Wright

Jack Maury

ON PAGE 45.

THE MIDDLE EAST
October 1980

How CIA "foul-ups" happen

Wilbur (Bill) Eveland is the most recent former CIA operative to "go public", writing a book while with the Agency. Eveland was for five years the late CIA Director Allen Dulles's main representative in the Middle East in the 1950s.

*Publication of his book, **Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East** was first delayed and then released in June after his attempts to co-operate with the CIA left him only the choice between scrapping the book or publishing it. Eveland talks to Robert Manning in an exclusive interview.*



Manning: Why did the CIA try to block publication of this book?

Eveland: I'd say embarrassment, but of course, security is the reason that they give. But I'd like to correct you. Blocking the book is not quite the right expression. I think they took the opportunity to delay the book, which is one of the results of the Snapp decision. (This required former CIA officer Frank Snapp to turn over all the profits from his book).

I went to the CIA voluntarily, and instructed my publisher to send them the book or the last portion of it, but they wrote to me a letter saying they refused to review it.

□ Review copies of the galleys had been circulated. Surely the CIA had sufficient intelligence to know that?

○ The manuscript was completed in September 1979 and the publishers distributed 16,000 copies of their catalogue announcing its publication in November. The *New York Times* mentioned it as a forthcoming book in January. But when I brought it to their attention on the 29 February the CIA said they didn't know about it. If they are that badly informed we are in trouble.

□ You didn't work directly for the Agency but were at different times "on loan" from the White House, State Department or Defence Department. Is this typical?

○ No, it isn't. After John Foster Dulles (former Secretary of State) died, there was no possibility of this ever happening again. The close relationship between John Foster and his brother Allen (CIA chief) had made my assignments possible. I had a job that should not exist.

□ You say that, after the 1952 coup in Egypt, Allen Dulles and Kim Roosevelt supported Nasser and provided covert aid.

○ Allen Dulles was not happy putting together forecasts - he was an operator and he knew the Middle East. He had this great OSS (the CIA's predecessor) background,

but couldn't get out in the field. However, he did have Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt, who was a prominent Ivy League man from a good family but didn't know much about the Middle East. He was an extension of Dulles's personality.

When they managed to bring the Shah back in the 1950s after they goofed so badly that he had to flee, this was taken as an indication that the CIA could change governments and direct national affairs in foreign countries.

Just before that, King Farouq had been overthrown in Egypt - an event in which the CIA was not involved. We needed an Arab leader, and when it became clear that Nasser was the man behind the coup, Roosevelt befriended him. He was a natural Arab leader and they thought he would be tractable. But he turned out to have some ideas of his own.

□ Could you elaborate on CIA covert aid to Nasser?

○ I was in the Secretary of Defence's office in charge of the Middle East at the time. Military aid to Middle East states was something we were trying to prevent the British, French and ourselves from getting involved in. The feeling was that you don't make peace by arming people. So we had a French, British and American grouping which tried to control the levels of arms.

Egypt was a separate case, however, because of the huge British base at Suez. Egypt wanted the 80,000 British troops out. In return for its agreeing that the British would be able to return in the event of war, President Eisenhower made an unprecedented decision to grant military aid to the Egyptian army. This was a courageous act because the Israeli lobby was very much against it, but it was top-secret.

To keep Nasser in business until we could get through all the formalities, the CIA was authorised to make \$3 million in covert funds available to him. This was for the purchase of uniforms, cars, etc., to keep his officers loyal until we could get some real

equipment out there.

□ But didn't Nasser take the money almost as a joke?

○ This again is part of how the CIA handles things. If it had been handled properly, there wouldn't have been a foul-up. But Miles Copeland, who was in charge of this, was one of Kim's acolytes. He gave a suitcase containing \$3 million to one of Nasser's assistants, with a message that "this was for Gamal". Nasser was insulted because he thought it was a personal bribe. But he didn't want to give the money back, so he built a massive monument - it became a television tower - opposite the Nile Hilton hotel. It is commonly referred to as "Roosevelt's erection".

□ You portray the Dulles brothers as seeing the hand of the USSR in every event. How did their views of Nasser change so quickly?

○ You should distinguish between the two Dulles brothers. John Foster had the ideas, and formulated policies. He would often say to Allen, for example, "I have a bad ambassador out there; can't your boys (CIA) do something about it?" Foster's sense of morality permitted no grey areas. If something wasn't the way he liked, it was Communist. Either you were pro-Western and willing to join us in an alliance or you were on the Soviet side.

The neutrality which emerged from the Bandung conference in this period was anathema to him. He felt sorry for countries which didn't realise that the Russian bear would grab them if they didn't stay with us. I think one of the things that triggered it was Nasser's decision to recognise Communist China. There was a series of things like this which caused Foster Dulles to be disenchanted with Nasser.

□ What about the coup in Syria that you helped to organise?

○ Which one?

□ In the mid-1950s.

○ I presume you mean the one I was involved in involuntarily. That was a trap that

CONTINUED

Kermit Roosevelt, Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles were persuaded to fall into by British Premier Anthony Eden. The British were convinced that Nasser had become a "Hitler on the Nile" and had to be removed at all costs.

They knew the US Government would oppose any operation, particularly a military one, to overthrow the Government. So to divert us and ensure that our hands were also dirty, the British induced the CIA to plan a coup in Syria. We had a good embassy, but the CIA station was very low-level with very few contacts.

I had been sent out to develop high-level contacts, and when the possibility of a coup came up I was the man that they turned to. But I never felt it could succeed.

I got a cable telling me to take the money over the hill (from Beirut to Damascus) to a man (Ilyan) who was to be the new leader of Syria. The coup was timed (even delayed) to coincide with Israel's attack on the Suez Canal. Fortunately, the man with whom I had been dealing listened to the radio. He quickly drove to Beirut and accused me of treachery.

□ Did the top-level CIA leaders know this or were they doublecrossed by the British and French?

○ I would say it was naïveté rather than a doublecross. It was just good planning. If I were British I probably would have done the same thing.

□ Was there a lot of tension between British, French and US intelligence?

○ We would not subscribe to the British contention that Iraq was the only cornerstone to be preserved for the West and that Nasser had to be done away with at all costs. This was partly because the CIA had been so heavily involved with Nasser.

□ Didn't Allen Dulles change his view after the Suez crisis?

○ Yes, there was a period in 1957-58 when a number of different plans were developed to remove Nasser, some recruiting friendly Arab countries. The Lebanese, Iraqis and the Jordanians were involved with us, and to a limited extent the Saudis. On the other hand, the CIA dealt unilaterally with the Mossad and the British and French were also co-ordinating with us.

Our actions sprang from a casual statement by Eisenhower which the Dulles brothers misinterpreted. He had said, "We ought to get rid of this problem in Egypt," meaning we should improve relations with Nasser. But once Eisenhower found out assassination teams were being fielded, he explained that he had not wanted to kill Nasser.

□ Why did Eisenhower send the US Marines into Lebanon in 1958?

○ This action was triggered by the July 1958 coup in Iraq. It caught us totally by surprise. Egyptian radio had been encouraging the Iraqis to get rid of the monarchy and the perennial Prime Minister Nuri Said. Washington saw it as Communist-inspired, and feared it would spread throughout the Middle East.

Lebanese President Camille Chamoun had made an official request for us to send troops if he called for them. I had taken the request to Washington and was returning with a refusal when the Iraqi coup occurred. We landed troops because of the Iraqi coup, not because of anything in Lebanon.

□ What about the 1975-76 civil war. Did the CIA, along with Israel, send in guns for the Christian right-wing militias?

○ The clandestine supply of arms to the

"I am frightened by the prospect of Kissinger ever again being allowed officially to sit behind a desk in Washington"

Christian right by Israel, with US blessing, has been confirmed by the Lebanese. There are indications of CIA involvement, and that Greece was the CIA staging post. I don't have positive proof of this, but I have talked to people who should know, and I believe them.

□ Several recent books have suggested that US intelligence is heavily dependent on Israel's Mossad. How strong is the connection?

○ Yes, I mention it in my book. The connection is less close since the mid-70s when former CIA chief Bill Colby fired James Angleton, or induced him to resign. Angleton was the man with Mossad. It certainly still exists, and I was told in 1959 by Allen Dulles that it was going to be expanded. I said that this seemed to me like putting a mouse in charge of cheese. Israeli reports about Communist or nationalist penetration in Arab states would be biased.

□ Were there any quid pro quos with Israel for this?

○ I think US assistance in developing an atomic capability was one.

□ Could you elaborate?

○ Well, one of the conditions for Israeli withdrawal from Egypt in 1956 was an arrangement between the US and Israel, a very secret one. We would assist, or at least not interfere, in their acquiring a nuclear capability, and then not admit that we were aware of it.

□ In the book you portray the Agency as having close contacts with oil company executives. How far do they control US policy?

○ In the 1950s we didn't have enough trained people to staff our embassies and we were just becoming aware that the area was important. The oil companies had large numbers of people there. Without formally taking part in formulating policy towards the Middle East they were an influencing factor. But I don't think this has been as true since the early 1970s.

□ Given the present US commitment to Egypt, does the US have any contingency plans if Sadat goes?

○ I agree with the assessment that Sadat is

not firmly in control. I can only hope that the US does have contingency plans. My position is that only if there is someone suitable to replace the regime, and they can be put in without the Russians marching in, should we go ahead.

I think we put additional burdens on Sadat by using his airfields in the Iran rescue attempt, manoeuvring troops in there and trying to establish bases. Sadat has more than he can handle dealing with Camp David.

□ Is Egypt becoming an open house for CIA activities, as Iran was?

○ It wouldn't surprise me if they beefed up their strength there. Lebanon during my days was the free port for all CIA activities in the Middle East but it is no longer available and very few states are. I'm sure if the CIA did want to increase its personnel in Egypt it would be able to do so.

□ What effect will the new CIA oversight bill have on covert activities? The new legislation allows the President to invoke "national security" when he sees fit. Couldn't that apply to almost anything?

○ Certainly it could. Anything that leaves ultimate discretion to the President without notifying Congress is to my mind a bad thing. I think the agency would like that sort of thing and so would any President. But I don't think the Congress - or the people - should.

□ Given the present cold war climate, couldn't the agency use this to define any given situation to its advantage?

○ It might, but I don't think that the bill will be passed, at least before the November elections. I'm not anti-CIA; I think we need a stronger CIA. But I think most of its members ought to be in Washington, and few overseas. I think we ought to be acquiring the best possible intelligence to put on the President's desk.

□ Could you comment on Kissinger's role?

○ I am frightened by the prospect of Kissinger ever again being allowed officially to sit behind a desk in Washington.

□ Your book shows that the US operates on the assumption that great men make history and that popular sentiments can be disregarded.

○ I will explain what I mean by America's failure in the Middle East. We looked to the area as a source of oil and a platform for military bases. Those were our two first priorities. A poor third was the aspiration of the people. If we put the people first and the oil second then we won't need the other, the military bases.

□ It would appear to be in the US interest to achieve a just and lasting peace taking into account the needs of the Palestinian people.

○ I think it would do us all good to study the history of the US role in the Middle East. This includes James Earl Carter and that man Brzezinski, who until 1953, when we conducted the Iran operation, was living in Poland.

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Barnett Case

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Spy Who Branched Out

The pay phone in a Bethesda, Md., shopping center rang right on schedule—two minutes before 3 p.m., April 5, 1980. But FBI agent Michael Waguespack did not answer it. The ringing itself confirmed that the caller was a KGB agent known as Igor, actually Vladimir Popov, the third secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Igor tried twice more, then gave up. By arrangement, he would wait an hour and then dial again. But he would never reach his contact, David H. Barnett, a former CIA officer. The day before, Waguespack and two other FBI agents had completed the last of twelve interrogations of Barnett, who had confessed to selling CIA secrets to the Soviet Union.

The phone connection was one of many intriguing glimpses into the real world of spies unveiled in a Baltimore Federal court last week. Unemotionally, Barnett pleaded guilty to a single count of espionage—a plea arranged with prosecutors after he agreed to cooperate in an investigation of the damage he caused to national security. Further details of the secrets Barnett sold the KGB for \$92,600 will be presented in a sealed document to Federal District Court Judge Frank Kaufman before Barnett is sentenced Dec. 8. But the prosecutors made public a 25-page "statement of facts" in the case, uncontested by Barnett, that read like a John le Carré novel of safe houses, dead drops and code names.

In Debt: As the document told the story, Barnett first made overtures to the KGB in Indonesia in 1976. A low-level CIA operative for twelve years, he left the agency in 1970 and went into business in Surabaya—first as an entrepreneur, then an antique dealer and finally as manager of a shrimp plant. But after six years he was more than \$100,000 in debt to his employer and desperate. He typed out a note, offering his services to the KGB for \$70,000, and delivered it to the Soviet cultural attaché in Jakarta. There he was introduced to a KGB agent named Dmitry who arranged for him to meet with other KGB agents in Vienna and paid him \$25,000 in \$100, \$50 and \$20 U.S. bills.

In Vienna Barnett was taken to a KGB "safe house," where he described what he knew of CIA operations to three Soviet agents for ten hours. There and in later meetings in Jakarta, according to the statement, he betrayed

employees working under cover, the names of seven Soviet consular officials that the CIA had hoped to recruit in Surabaya, and details of a CIA operation known as HA/BRINK—an effort to collect information about weapons and manuals that the Soviets supplied to Indonesia in the 1960s. Then Barnett convinced the Soviets that he could get a job in the United States that would give him access to still more classified information. The agents paid him another \$45,000 and told him their chief targets were the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence and



Barnett: A cat-and-mouse game with Igor, Dmitry and the CIA

Research Bureau at the State Department.

For the next few months Barnett shuttled between Washington and Jakarta, collecting more money and lying boldly to his KGB contacts. After seeing an old friend at State for example, he told Dmitry that he had met with a "senior CIA official." He failed to find work in Washington, but told the KGB he had landed a job at the Intelligence Oversight Board—and the Soviets paid the shipping bills for his family to move back to the United States.

Before leaving, Barnett was introduced to Igor, who was to be his control officer in Washington. Igor (later identified as Popov) told Barnett about two pay phones near an Exxon station in suburban Virginia, where he was to wait for a call about 3 p.m. on the last Saturday of every month. If Barnett had information to pass on, Igor said, he should leave a package at a dead

C & O Canal, and place a piece of red tape on the side of a nearby phone booth.

For nine months Igor dialed the pay phones and checked for the red tape, but Barnett didn't make contact. His application for a job with the House Intelligence Committee was rejected, and he feared that if he tried for another full-time job at the CIA, he would flunk the agency's routine lie-detector test. Finally he landed a part-time job at the CIA, teaching espionage techniques to junior agents. Hoping for more money, Barnett returned to Jakarta and offered to sell the KGB a CIA training manual, but the Russians, now a bit testy over his failed promises, lies and elusive behavior, weren't interested. New arrangements were made to contact Igor at a phone booth in the Bethesda Medical Building, at a shopping

center and at a bowling alley in Annandale, Va., and Barnett agreed to meet with the KGB again in Vienna in April. He never made it. On March 18 FBI agents arrested him in his CIA classroom.

Exposed: How much damage did Barnett do? The full answer may never be made public. He apparently gave the Soviets little new information after moving to Washington, and that may have raised their suspicions that he might actually be a double agent, thus casting doubt on his earlier information. If any of the 30 covert CIA employees he named had never before been exposed, they would have to be reassigned and given new covers. If the CIA did recruit any of the Soviet prospects, their value had been compromised. The HA/BRINK operation did uncover valuable information that led to countermeasures against Soviet

missiles and ships; thanks to HA/BRINK, for instance, the United States knows how long Russia's Whiskey-class submarines can stay submerged. But Barnett said that the Soviets themselves were not very impressed with HA/BRINK, since they assumed that any weaponry supplied to foreign countries would eventually be an open secret.

Barnett may well have spilled more sensitive information than the CIA was willing to admit in court. He spent two years at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., and may have told the KGB details about the agency's inner structure and procedures. A full damage report will be contained in the secret document Judge Kaufman will review, and it will weigh heavily in determining whether Barnett receives the maximum sentence: life imprisonment.

CK with DAVID MARTIN
in Washington

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Mole Holes

The price of selling out

How much damage did former CIA Agent David Barnett do when he sold out to the Soviet KGB? Plenty, CIA and Justice Department officials had to admit last week when Barnett, 47, pleaded guilty in federal court in Baltimore to one count of espionage. He faces life in prison, but will probably get less in return for cooperating with U.S. officials.

In a 25-page statement filed with the court, Barnett described a series of meetings with Soviet KGB agents in 1976 and 1977 in which he revealed the identities of as many as 30 U.S. agents. The extent to which he compromised CIA undercover operations was not disclosed, but the agents exposed included "some important people," said one official. "All this is horrendous."

Barnett also told the KGB of seven Soviet consular officials whom the CIA was trying to recruit in Indonesia, where he served as CIA chief before retiring from the agency in 1970. Half a dozen years later, running into financial difficulties with his import-export business, he began selling secrets to the Soviets, for a total of nearly \$100,000. Among other things, Barnett told the KGB about an undercover operation called HABRINK, in which the CIA obtained technical information about Soviet military equipment supplied to Indonesia, including SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles, Styx naval cruise missiles and Tu-16 (Badger) bombers.

The KGB feigned lack of interest in Barnett's information. Nonetheless, it was extremely valuable because it would help them redesign tactics and weapons to foil countermeasures that had been taken by the U.S. Concluded the statement: "This could make the U.S. more vulnerable to these weapons systems."

Eventually HABRINK and Barnett were thoroughly exposed to almost everyone except his three children. According to Justice Department officials, the children learned that their father was a double agent only by reading last week's newspapers. ■

First CIA 'Mole'?

Spy Conviction Discloses Massive Security Breach

Displaying little emotion, save for his tightly clasped hands behind his back, David Henry Barnett pleaded guilty last week in a federal court in Baltimore to selling the Soviet KGB the full details of a highly successful Central Intelligence Agency operation.

The first CIA officer in the agency's 33-year history to be indicted on espionage charges, Barnett admitted to divulging to the Soviets that many of the weapons they supplied to Indonesia between 1959 and 1969 were resold to the CIA. The 47-year-old Barnett identified for them the Indonesian agent who arranged the resale and the 29 other Indonesians who aided him.

The purpose of the CIA operation, code-named HABRINK, was to secure—without the knowledge of the Indonesians or the Soviets—detailed information concerning the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system, the Russian Styx naval cruise missile, and the Soviet W-class submarine. "The information regarding that weaponry," according to the Justice Department's 25-page "statement of facts" read into the court record, "has never been available from any other source."

Information pertaining to the KOMAR-class guided missile patrol boats, the SVERDLOV-class cruiser, and the RIGA-class destroyer was also obtained.

The crucial importance of this program was underscored during the Vietnam war when HABRINK secured the guidance system from an SA-2 missile, the same missile used so effectively by the North Vietnamese in shooting down American aircraft. As a result of gaining the guidance system, it became possible to jam the radio frequencies used to direct the missile, thus saving the lives of many American bomber crews.

Though Barnett compromised HABRINK in 1976 and 1977, years after the Soviets had stopped giving aid to Indonesia, his disclosure has tipped off the Russians the extent of our knowledge of the workings of many of the weapons they have themselves or have given to their allies. Thus, Barnett's transmission of this top-secret information may very well allow the Soviets to improve their weapons to the point where they are virtually invulnerable to effective countermeasures we have already devised.

But Barnett compromised much more than just the HABRINK operation, as he detailed other CIA projects and fingered for the KGB covert CIA employees.

Barnett was employed by the CIA in the late 1950s and '60s as a contract employee and staff officer. His primary responsibility involved the conduct of clandestine intelligence operations, including operations fashioned to collect information on the Soviet Union.

Because of his position, he was given the highest kind of clearance. Deciding in 1970 that his employment with the CIA was not sufficiently remunerative, he left, went into business on his own, and, after suffering financial difficulties, approached the KGB in 1976 to sell them classified information.

Over the course of the next few years, as the Justice Department maintained in its "statement of facts" on the case, Barnett received approximately \$92,000 in exchange "for telling the KGB about CIA operations with which he was familiar, and the identities of numerous foreign nationals who at personal risk cooperated with the CIA by providing information of value to our nation's security."

"In addition, he furnished the true identities of CIA covert employees, and the identities of persons in the employ of the Soviet Union who had been targeted by the CIA for possible recruitment." He also agreed to try to re-penetrate the intelligence field, and applied for a staff position on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 1978.

In January 1979, Barnett was rehired by the CIA as a contract employee to train CIA employees in operational tradecraft. This position provided him with access to classified information.

Now he has been uncovered. But the question many security experts are asking is: just how many more Barnetts exist?

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Barnett Spy Case the Tip of an Iceberg

The recent exposure of former CIA agent David Henry Barnett's sellout to the Soviet Union is but one chapter in a story of treachery that has shaken the American intelligence community in the past four years. And more revelations can be expected in coming months.

Besides Barnett, the public has already learned about three other Americans who sold secret documents to Soviet intelligence: William Kampiles, Andrew Lee and Christopher Boyce. The public has also been told about the reported death of the top American spy in the Kremlin — code-named Trigon — whose cover may have been blown by a White House official's careless remark at a Washington diplomatic party.

But what the public doesn't know is that a major spy scandal may be developing, its proportions unmatched since the exposes that rocked the country after World War II. The Justice Department is investigating several cases involving leaks of sensitive information to the Soviets by U.S. officials and private individuals.

Because more positive proof is needed, it would be unfair to name names. But here are the details, given to my associate Dale Van Atta by sources in the White House, the Justice Department and the intelligence agencies:

- Some Carter administration officials are under investigation by the Justice Department for suspected espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.

One source said there are files on "at least three" such cases, and there may be as many as half a dozen.

- Intelligence sources charge that a high-level White House official recently blew the cover of a CIA agent who travels in an East European country. So far, the agent has not been warned that he has been compromised and that officials of the country he spies upon now know who and what he is.

- A ranking Romanian diplomat who defected last February has given CIA debriefers the details of a wide-ranging Soviet espionage operation based in the Romanian Embassy in Washington. Code-named "Liberty," the network was designed to penetrate the federal government at various levels. Each target had a code name: Congress was "Oregon," the White House was "Amazon" and the State Department, with sardonic Russian humor, was "Iowa." The Romanian diplomat had easy access to half a dozen Democratic senators and at least two Republican senators. More alarming, though, was the Romanian's identification of a former Senate staff member as a purveyor of intelligence to Romania. He was employed by a senior Democratic senator.

- Finally — and potentially more dangerous — is the Defense Intelligence Agency's concern that a Soviet "mole" may have penetrated to the highest levels of the U.S. government,

and now has access to closely held White House information.

A top-secret DIA report recently concluded that "a definite change in the Soviet underground nuclear test program occurred in 1978 toward testing increasingly higher-yield devices." The significance of this change lies in the fact that it occurred shortly after the United States secretly changed its method of measuring Soviet nuclear tests in such a way that the Russians could explode bigger bombs without violating existing treaties. DIA analysts decided this was "more than coincidence," and pointed to the hair-raising possibility that information about the new measuring system had been leaked to the Kremlin by one of the very few high U.S. officials who knew about it.

Added to the cases already made public in recent years, the investigations being pursued paint a grim picture of our nation's intelligence security. The Russians apparently have experienced little difficulty recruiting greedy or gullible Americans to provide military secrets the Kremlin wants.

And while Barnett was well paid for his treachery — \$92,000 — and Lee and Boyce collected more than \$80,000, the KGB doesn't spend more than it has to. It paid young Kampiles, for example, only \$3,100 for priceless data on the CIA's most advanced satellite surveillance system.

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CIA TURNCOAT

A Man of Profound Detachment

By Thomas O'Toole
and Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writers

When David Henry Barnett was growing up in Robinson Township outside Pittsburgh, he went to a school so small he had only one classmate. The class ahead of him had three pupils, one of them Pennsylvania Gov. Richard Thornburgh. Barnett's lone classmate, Caroline Patsch, said the last time she saw him was at Thornburgh's inauguration in 1979. "I kidded him about being such a stuffed shirt," Patsch said from her home in Rosslyn Farms, Pa., "because he looked so serious."

Pausing, Patsch grew serious. "I think I was the closest one to him in the school, and I don't feel like I ever knew him. Dave Barnett always looked like he had a secret." Barnett's secret is out. He has been indicted and has pleaded guilty to a charge he took \$92,600 from the Soviet KGB [committee of state security] in exchange for details of a top-secret covert operation the United States ran against the Soviets in Indonesia; the names of 30 Indonesians the CIA paid to help in the operation, the identities and personality traits of undercover CIA employees and the identities of Soviet diplomats the CIA had targeted for possible recruitment.

Now 47, David Henry Barnett is the first CIA officer to be charged with espionage since the agency was created in 1947. He faces weeks of grilling by the FBI and the CIA to find out everything he told the Soviets and everything he remembers about the Soviets to whom he told it. He will do his talking hooked to a lie detector, which will be watched by the FBI's foremost polygraph expert. Even if the FBI is satisfied he is telling the truth, Barnett faces life imprisonment. Twenty years ago, Barnett could have been executed.

What would make a man who served the CIA in undercover operations for 12 years turn to the Soviets and "give them the store?" In talks with people he knew as a youngster, with friends he made later in life, with former officers of the CIA who knew him and with FBI and Justice Department sources who helped prosecute him, a picture emerges of a man so detached, so aloof, so unfeeling that he may not realize the gravity of what he did.

"Dave Barnett is the least analytical man I know," said one neighbor of his last week. "I've never met a man as detached as he is from the things that go on around him."

Barnett grew up in Robinson Township, a tiny rural community southwest of Pittsburgh where people know each other all their lives. The house he lived in is no longer there. It burned down several years ago in a tragic fire that killed his father. His mother had died earlier. When Barnett visits Pittsburgh, he stays with an uncle.

The Rosslyn Farms school Barnett attended is still there but it's not a school anymore. When it was a school, Rosslyn Farms had four classrooms for eight grades, two grades to a classroom. In a setting like that, one would think youngsters would grow very close. "Not David," Caroline Patsch remembers. "He lived in his own little world."

Barnett attended Mercersburg Academy, then enrolled at the University of Michigan, from which he was graduated in 1955. He served in the Army, then came to Washington where he was hired by the CIA as a contract employee instructing recruits at Camp Peary, Va. He left the agency in May 1960, was rehired in June 1961 and became a staff officer in March 1963. He left immediately for Indonesia, where he went under cover in an operation codenamed HABRINK. He told friends he was going to Korea as a government interpreter.

Just before he left for Indonesia, Barnett met Sarah Blount, who came from Michigan and was working on Capitol Hill. In a week, they were engaged. They were married before he left the United States.

At the time Barnett was involved, HABRINK was one of the most successful undercover operations the CIA ever conducted. Indonesia was then under the rule of President Sukarno, whose army, navy and air force were being armed by the Soviet Union. The CIA had penetrated the Indonesian navy and was paying one of its top officers \$30,000 a year to hand over Soviet weapons and training manuals as soon as they arrived. No fewer than 29 other Indonesian naval officers were being paid by the CIA to help him.

In between two tours in Indonesia, Barnett served for two years at CIA headquarters in Langley, where he helped direct HABRINK. Nobody knew more detail of its operation. His second tour ended at the Indonesian seaport of Surabaya, where he was chief of base. It was January 1970, Sukarno was dead, the Indonesians were no longer being armed by the Soviets and HABRINK had just been terminated after 10 years. Barnett decided to leave the CIA.

When he came back to the United States, Barnett took a job teaching English and coaching wrestling at the Kiskiminetas School, a boys prep school in Saltsburg, Pa. He'd been a teacher there in 1960-61, between leaving and rejoining the CIA. The headmaster had told Barnett there would always be a job for him. When Barnett had left for Indonesia, he told the headmaster he'd be back in a year.

But Barnett wasn't the same man when he came back to the "Kiski" School in 1970. He had a wife, a son and an urge to make money. The Kiski School wasn't the place to make it. For awhile, Barnett thought he might become headmaster of the school. When that didn't pan out, he decided to go back to Indonesia.

"I think he was disappointed in the way his life was going," a fellow teacher said. "He found

On returning to Indonesia, Barnett bought into a shrimp factory and started a furniture export business. He soon found out he was a poor businessman. He borrowed more than \$100,000 from the shrimp factory to support his furniture business. By 1976, he was deeply in debt and both the shrimp factory and the furniture business were close to bankruptcy.

Desperate, Barnett approached a Soviet diplomat he'd known before in Jakarta. He needed \$70,000 to get out of debt and offered his knowledge of HABRINK in return for the money. A week later, Barnett began briefing the KGB on HABRINK, an operation the Soviets knew nothing about. Barnett got \$25,000 in \$20, \$50 and \$100 bills.

The KGB told Barnett he'd get the \$70,000 he needed but only if he went to Vienna and met higher-up KGB officers to tell them everything he knew about the CIA. In February 1977, Barnett went to Vienna, where he was taken to a KGB safehouse outside the city.

The Justice Department contends that when Barnett was in Vienna he gave the KGB the names of the 30 Indonesians hired by the CIA in HABRINK, the names of numerous CIA covert operatives and the names of many Soviet diplomats the CIA was hoping to recruit. Barnett was paid \$15,000 more, plus his travel expenses to Vienna and back to Jakarta.

"This was his biggest betrayal," one former CIA officer said. "Identifying undercover CIA operatives to the KGB." On returning to Jakarta, the

KGB officers there met again with Barnett and offered him \$30,000 more if he'd go back to the United States and resume working for the CIA. He agreed to try and was paid the \$30,000. The KGB financed two trips back to the United States for Barnett, who tried unsuccessfully to get staff jobs

on the White House Intelligence Oversight Board and the Senate Intelligence Committee.

"He was afraid to apply again to the CIA," one Justice Department source said. "He didn't think he could pass their lie detector test."

Just before he left Indonesia for good, Barnett met a Russian identified only as Igor who told Barnett he'd be his contact in Washington. Igor told Barnett he lived in Virginia and gave him the numbers of two telephones outside a gasoline station in Annandale and the location of a "dead drop site" near

Lock 11 on the C & O canal. Igor was Vladimir V. Popov, then a third secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Barnett never used the drop site or the Annandale telephones to communicate with Popov but he did use a public phone in the Bethesda Medical Building to talk to him on the last Saturday of each month. The conversations were short. Barnett told Popov he was having a hard time finding the right job.

Finally, in January 1979, Barnett was rehired as a contract employee for the CIA at \$200 a day teaching surveillance to recruits. It was not a sensitive job and Barnett did not have to take a lie detector test to get it. But Popov told him it was not what the KGB expected.

By late 1979, the FBI was following Popov and was picking up his conversations with Barnett. They didn't have a tap on the phones Popov was using. They used new electronic devices that snatched his conversations out of the air.

Barnett's neighbors in Bethesda noticed his attitude had grown even more aloof — there was an air of complete detachment about him, they said. Still in debt, he began to drink heavily. He became more detached from his family, now including three children. His wife did the heavy work around their rented house in Bethesda.

When the FBI finally rang Barnett's doorbell in April, it came as a complete surprise to his wife. She had no idea Barnett was taking money from the Russians; he had put most of it in a separate checking account. Three days after the FBI rang her doorbell, Sarah Barnett, 40, suffered a stroke while washing the family car outside the house.

As for Barnett, friends who've known him all his life say he's more detached than ever. One neighbor said the day the news broke about his involvement with the KGB Barnett told him the story in the newspaper was "90 percent inaccurate." A day later, Barnett was calling on neighbors trying to sell a consignment of Indonesian furniture that had just arrived. Said one neighbor: "He's lost touch with reality. I don't think he comprehends what it is he did."

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The Nation

In Summary

Voices of Authority At the F.B.I. Trial

The last witnesses passed in review last week at the trial in Washington of W. Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller, accused of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of citizens by authorizing unlawful break-ins when they were, respectively, acting associate director and director of intelligence for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the early 1970's. And some witnesses they were, too: four former Attorneys General of the United States and one former President.

Richard M. Nixon, who had avoided appearing in court since his resignation in 1974, denied that in his day it was necessary, as the prosecution contends, for the F.B.I. to go to the Attorney General for authorization to conduct warrantless searches in cases related to national security. He testified that he had once specifically authorized a program including such searches, but revoked his approval four days later at the request of J. Edgar Hoover. But it was his understanding, he said, that he did not thereby revoke Mr. Hoover's own authority to order such searches.

Of the Attorneys General, all four — Ramsey Clark, John N. Mitchell, Richard G. Kleindienst and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach — said they might have authorized such entries, depending on circumstances. But only Mr. Clark said he was ever asked.

All of last week's witnesses were called by the prosecution to make the record complete on the chain of com-

mand. But some of what they said may give comfort to defense lawyers in final arguments this week. If the bureau doesn't ask Attorneys General or Presidents whether break-ins are allowed, then it may be argued that the authority lies in the F.B.I. itself. The defendants have said that L. Patrick Gray, then chief of the bureau, authorized what they did; Mr. Gray, who faces similar charges, has denied this, but has not been called to testify.

Double Agent, Doublecross

In a case said to represent the deepest proven Soviet penetration of Central Intelligence Agency operations, David H. Barnett, a former C.I.A. officer, pleaded guilty last week in Baltimore to one count of selling American secrets to the Russians. Mr. Barnett is to be sentenced Dec. 8, and the sentence (which could be life) will presumably be influenced by how forthcoming he is with details of how the Russians operated in their contacts with him.

The Justice Department prefers to settle spy cases by plea bargaining to avoid disclosure of secret information in court. But the Government revealed this much: Mr. Barnett, it said, had exposed the identities of 30 secret American agents and described "numerous" agency operations to the Russians. In particular, the Government said, he sold them information about the sale to the United States of information about Russian weapons sold to Indonesia in the late 1960's.

Caroline Rand Herron
and Michael Wright

ARTICLE APPEARED
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CORD MEYER

The Soviet Bear in the Honey Pot

The failure of CIA veteran David H. Barnett to gain access as a Soviet spy to the rich lode of secret intelligence concentrated in the Senate and House intelligence committees gives new currency to the old adage that God looks after fools, drunkards and the United States.

When Barnett first applied to the two committees for a staff job in 1977, he had a reassuring record of past CIA service and a recommendation from a member of Congress. Committee staffers admit that only the sheer chance that no job openings were then available obstructed the probable success of this brilliantly-conceived KGB penetration effort.

Ever since the two intelligence committees were first established, with wide access to the most sensitive intelligence sources and methods, counterintelligence experts have feared that the Russian bear would be drawn to this new honey pot. But they did not foresee anything as daring as an attempt by the KGB's First Chief Directorate to use a CIA penetration to pry open the lid on the congressionally-held secrets.

Shocked by this dramatic revelation into realizing they are on the front line, committee staffers agree they must take a new look at their security procedures. They are quick to point out that Congress is not as vulnerable as it was before President Carter on Oct. 14 signed new legislation that repeals the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, which required the president to report all covert action operations to eight committees of Congress.

The Risk Reduced

Under the new law, the president now has to report such operations only to the two intelligence committees and, with one-fourth as many people in the act, there has been a substantial reduction of risk. At the same time, the new legislation strengthens these two committees in their right to demand full access to the most sensitive information to enable them to carry out their oversight responsibilities.

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This means that in the files and staff memories of these committees there now resides the highest concentration of vital secrets collected anywhere in Washington outside the Oval Office, and the KGB will predictably persist in its attempts to infiltrate. It is fair to ask how effectively these committees are organized to defend themselves, since congressional oversight can become a dangerous liability if it opens the way to easy penetration.

White House staffers and counterintelligence experts tend to agree that the intelligence committees have provided good physical security, and strict rules are adhered to in hiring new staff personnel. Once a candidate has been found acceptable on grounds of professional competence, he is subjected to a full FBI field check. The results are reviewed by CIA security officers before a final decision is made.

One weakness in this defensive armor is seen to be serious. In both the National Security Agency and the CIA, lie detector tests are required as a condition of initial employment and are administered thereafter on a periodic basis. They are unpleasant, but formidably effective in spotting KGB plants.

Although urged to adopt this technical means of protection, the congressional leadership has so far refused to submit their intelligence staffs to this discipline. Since these staffers have access to an even higher concentration of sensitive information than most intelligence officers, there is no excuse for this double standard.

Fallible Security

The fact that the KGB was able to recruit Barnett after his resignation from the CIA's operational directorate in 1970 proves that even the strictest security procedures are not infallible. Compared to the past vulnerability of German, French and British intelligence to KGB infiltration, the CIA's record is not bad, and this is the first proven KGB recruitment of a former agency operations officer. But one is too many. The extent of the damage he caused is indicated by the fact the KGB paid him more than \$92,000 for services rendered.

How he was caught eventually will make a fascinating story, but both the FBI and the CIA are being justifiably vague on this point to protect sensitive sources from KGB counterattack. Barnett was apparently under suspicion when he was rehired on a contract basis by the CIA in 1979. According to a Justice Department spokesman, "This very complicated case was handled with clinical professionalism," and it did not take long to get the conclusive evidence of guilt that U.S. espionage laws require for conviction.

The final judgment on just how competent our intelligence agencies were in defusing this threat will rest with the Senate and House intelligence committees, who were themselves so nearly penetrated.

But one thing is clear. KGB attempts to infiltrate American society are not confined to the pages of spy novels. They are a continuing and ever-present reality that should inspire neither hysterical alarm nor cynical disbelief — but rather a prudent effort to tighten up security precautions and to strengthen counterintelligence defenses.

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
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KGB 'paid ex-CIA man \$100,000 to be double agent'

By RICHARD BEESTON in Washington

AMERICA'S Justice Department is investigating allegations that a once highly-placed CIA agent in the agency's clandestine directorate of operations was recruited by the KGB to obtain secrets for Moscow by infiltrating the Senate Intelligence Committee.

The agent allegedly accepted \$100,000 (about £241,000) from the KGB to penetrate the committee and intelligence groups.

"This is as close as the KGB has ever got to penetrating the CIA's cover-operations," a law enforcement official, was quoted in yesterday's New York Times.

The CIA has always claimed that it has never had a "Kim Philby" in its intelligence operations directorate and one source said yesterday that it was the first time accusations had been made against a covert agent passing secrets to the KGB.

Law enforcement officials said that the matter is before a grand jury and that official action is expected by the end of the week. Officials said the case was one of the most significant espionage attempts in recent years and part of a continuing KGB effort to penetrate American intelligence.

Government sources said the agent, Mr. David Barnett, left the CIA in 1970 to start his own business but did contract work for the agency as recently as last year. Through his contacts in the CIA he had access to information about American weapons systems.

An account in the New York Times said that Mr. Barnett allegedly accepted the \$100,000 in return for trying to get a job on the Senate Committee staff which would have given him access to some of the government's most secret intelligence. A Committee spokesman said he believed Mr. Barnett's application was made in 1976 or 1977, but he was not hired.

The New York Times said that it was during Mr. Barnett's most recent association with the agency that he came under suspicion as a double agent. When the alleged association with the KGB was discovered, said officials, a dispute developed between the CIA and the FBI about how to proceed. The CIA officials claimed, considered trying to turn Mr. Barnett into a "triple agent," but FBI officials urged immediate prosecution on the grounds of the extreme seriousness of the case.

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN
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GOP tries it, too

Lest anyone think we're in the Republican camp, here's an Opportunist award for the GOP for trying to make political mileage out of the latest double agent caper.

The plot is as complex as a John LeCarre spy novel. A former Pennsylvania school teacher who worked for the Central Intelligence Agency had gone over to the Soviets and tried to infiltrate two congressional intelligence committees.

Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.) charged that the CIA and the Justice Department did nothing about the double agent for more than a year. The CIA, however, was reluctant to have him prosecuted as long as there was a chance of turning him into a triple agent. Thurmond's statement echoed similar private allegations from other Republicans, the New York Times reported, and appeared to be designed to embarrass the Carter Administration in the final days of the presidential campaign.